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Introduction
Over the past few decades, visual art has become a frequent subject of high-profile
copyright and fair use debates, leaving artists today with a growing list of challenges to consider
when making new work. The concept of authorship and its artistic fluidity from the midtwentieth century to the present day have had an especially strong effect on the conditions that
have shaped copyright disputes in the visual arts. Through the lens of three contemporary
copyright infringement cases, this thesis examines separate but closely related topics in the field
of art law, each of them grounded in the recent history of art and its controversies. Taken
together, my examination of these three cases illuminates the unique set of legal conditions
shaping contemporary artmaking, sale, and exhibition through copyright and art law in the
United States.
The law generally adapts to the issues it seeks to regulate. It can become challenging,
however, to address the nuances of the visual arts within a system that relies on clarity. The
clearest developments in the chase to maintain legal relevance in the art world can be found in
copyright. While these laws have existed in some form for hundreds of years, the broadening of
artistic practice over time has ushered in an ever-wider variety of concerns to address. Art
historian Martha Buskirk interprets copyright, in its inception and development alike, as “a series
of responses to the potential for disruption inherent in various new forms of technology.”1 She
clarifies that copyright is reactionary: as each new method of reproduction essentially eliminates
the need for those which came before it, people wish to protect the value of their intellectual
property. This protection comes in the form of legal restrictions on production and expression in
order to preserve the profitability of the protected property. The threat of new technologies on
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Martha Buskirk, “Commodification as Censor: Copyrights and Fair Use,” October 60 (1992): 84.
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the arts in general began with the printing press and has continued through the evolution of
digital media. Copyright has therefore existed in some form for hundreds of years; it began to
flourish in the United States by the late eighteenth century.
Copyright does not protect all aspects of each original work. The United States Copyright
Office offers a basic definition of copyright and its protections:
Copyright is a form of protection provided by the laws of the United States to the authors
of “original works of authorship” that are fixed in a tangible form of expression. An
original work of authorship is a work that is independently created by a human author
and possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity. A work is “fixed” when it is
captured (either by or under the authority of an author) in a sufficiently permanent
medium such that the work can be perceived, reproduced, or communicated for more
than a short time.2
From the point at which the work is “fixed,” the original author gains the right to use or
distribute their work however they wish. The respective nuances of artmaking and copyright law
do not easily align. Court decisions are often made through a combination of clear-cut law and
the discretion of the judge. Because it is impossible for legal acts and precedents to cover all
potential conditions, legal professionals must focus on possible interpretations that can apply to
the issue at hand.
The most influential act passed in the United States relating to these issues is the
Copyright Act of 1976 and its doctrine of fair use, which went into effect on January 1, 1978. In
its 1977 guide to the updates, the United States Copyright Office cites the significant number of
new technologies that had developed since the early twentieth century, namely “new techniques
for communicating,” because the 1909 revision was “based on the printing press as the prime
disseminator.”3 The doctrine of fair use is found within the deceptively short Section 107 of the
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United States Copyright Office, “Circular 1: Copyright Basics,” last modified December 2019, 1.
https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ01.pdf.
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US Copyright Office, General Guide to the Copyright Act of 1976, Appendix One, pg. A1
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Copyright Act of 1976. Under this doctrine, certain uses of a copyrighted work do not constitute
copyright infringement, even without permission from the original author or current copyright
holder. The list of potential conditions given in Section 107 is not exhaustive. Instead, the
determination of fair use is based on, but not limited to, a minimum of four factors:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work
as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.4
Some, all, or none of these factors may contribute to a finding of fair use, though the greatest
weight tends to fall upon the first and fourth factors in visual arts cases. In theory, this doctrine
offers a greater stimulus for creativity because, as law professor and artist Michael E. Jones
clarifies, “by definition a copyright is an economic monopoly that grants certain exclusive rights
to artists or rights holders for a limited time period. The justification for giving artists an
economic incentive is to stimulate and reward artistic creativity.”5 This exclusivity has its
obstacles, however, as borrowing and copying have become a natural part of the creative
ecosystem over the course of several centuries.6 Though it was intended to stimulate creativity,
the introduction of fair use adds a layer of complication in decisions of authorship, originality,
and infringement.
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Copyright Act of 1976, 17 USC § 107 (1976), https://www.copyright.gov/title17/92chap1.html#107.
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Michael E. Jones., Art Law: A Concise Guide for Artists, Curators, and Art Educators (Lanham: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2016), 119.
6

Alongside the longstanding practice of copying in artistic training, copies have been a recognized and accepted
mode of artistic production since at least the Renaissance.

3

This thesis fills critical research gaps in an ever-growing collection of texts that direct
scholarly attention to copyright issues in the visual arts, though many of these texts only appear
in legal journals. Though many relevant lawsuits are well-known in the art world from news
coverage and as examples in books and essays by authors such as Buskirk and Amy Adler, their
significance outside potential implications for the law itself is not widely addressed by authors in
this field. By focusing on each artist, their work, and the larger issues of art and authorship
surrounding the lawsuits in which they found themselves, this thesis investigates how each legal
dispute relates to the broader dynamics of the contemporary art world.
A growing body of scholarship exists on the nuances and flaws of our copyright system
in visual arts cases. Buskirk, a professor of art history and criticism at Montserrat College of Art,
is one of the leading scholars on the intersection of contemporary art and copyright issues, with a
focus on authorship, ownership, and intellectual property questions in the visual arts. Two of her
texts are particularly relevant to this thesis. The first, Buskirk’s 1992 essay “Commodification as
Censor,” examines the practices of copying and mass-production in contemporary art and their
potential implications for the future interpretation of copyright law. Buskirk notes that “the
issues surrounding copying have become increasingly complex as artists have used reproductive
techniques to incorporate mass-media and related images into their work.”7 Briefly noting the
legal troubles that artists such as Robert Rauschenberg and Andy Warhol encountered in their
reproductions of media photographs, Buskirk also investigates newer strategies of appropriation
with a focus on Rogers v. Koons, a then-ongoing copyright infringement dispute involving a
sculpture by Jeff Koons. In this essay, Buskirk argues that the existing case documentation
highlights “the collision of two different types of authors” that has resulted in a hierarchy of

7

Buskirk, “Commodification as Censor,” 100.
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authorship, dividing “those who retain the category of author as defined by various segments of
twentieth-century theory and criticism and those who do not” in determinations of fair use.8
Buskirk’s latest book, Is it Ours? Art, Copyright, and Public Interest, addresses similar
legal clashes in its second chapter, “The Appropriation Game.”9 This chapter expands upon the
idea of the fair use doctrine’s hierarchies of authorship in appropriation art, including an
overview of Richard Prince’s various copyright feuds. In addition to this chapter, Buskirk’s book
serves as an overarching guide to the multitude of contemporary debates surrounding ownership,
access, and control over images, as well as the layers of complication which copyright law has
added to each of these concepts. While she favors shorter case studies over longer investigations
of specific scenarios, her writing is a useful introduction to the concepts that are central to this
thesis. Drawing heavily from Buskirk’s observations on the construction and preservation of
authorship, each chapter of this thesis builds upon her research by incorporating new legal
developments and under-researched court documents into an investigation of the ways in which
artists may find themselves defending their own authorship in court.
Adler, a law professor at New York University, is a similarly prominent figure at the
intersection of art and copyright. Her writing offers in-depth, often deconstructive analyses of
various particularities of copyright law and fair use interpretation that, in her opinion, simply do
not work in visual arts cases. In her 2016 article “Fair Use and the Future of Art,” Adler suggests
that the past few decades of copyright infringement cases have, in their increasing focus on the
rather nebulous concept of “transformativeness,” had a chilling effect on creativity in the visual
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Ibid., 104.
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Martha Buskirk, Is it Ours? Art, Copyright, and Public Interest (Oakland, California: University of California
Press, 2021), 49-74.
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arts.10 Adler’s primary case study, Cariou v. Prince, is also the subject of the first chapter of this
thesis. While Adler repeatedly cites Prince’s work to support her argument that courts should end
their search for “transformativeness” altogether, this thesis does not argue for such an abolition;
instead, it revisits Prince’s legal defense while building upon Adler’s analysis of the case in order
to describe additional qualities which might characterize an artwork as transformative.
In a similar 2018 essay, “Why Art Does Not Need Copyright,” Adler asserts that
copyright law, particularly the fair use doctrine, “does not—and cannot—incentivize the creation
of visual art.”11 She explains that art does not require legal protection against copying due to the
art market’s overwhelming interest in originals over copies. This “norm of authenticity,”
according to Adler, is an economic phenomenon which “ensures that even if an artist’s visual
content (but not name) is stolen, the thief cannot misappropriate the economic value of the work
itself.”12 In an investigation of the fourth factor of fair use, which focuses on an infringing
artwork’s impact on another artist’s sales, the second chapter of this thesis aligns Adler’s norm
of authenticity with related research on connoisseurship and the social behaviors which
determine the value of artworks. Adler also argues that the superfluous nature of copyright in the
visual arts leads artists today to primarily invoke these laws as a vehicle for moral rights claims;
that is, artists pursue copyright infringement lawsuits “to police and protect their reputations and
artistic vision.”13 The third chapter of this thesis contextualizes this argument, alongside relevant
research from Buskirk, within the history of art and activism in the late twentieth century. Taken
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Amy Adler, “Fair Use and the Future of Art,” New York University Law Review 91, no. 3 (2016): 559-626.
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Amy Adler, “Why Art Does Not Need Copyright,” George Washington Law Review 86, no. 2 (2018): 313.
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Adler, “Why Art Does Not Need Copyright,” 330.
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together, these two authors provide a firm foundation for three interrelated case studies on the
intersection of copyright and visual art.
Chapter One re-examines one of the most influential court decisions in the visual arts:
Patrick Cariou v. Richard Prince, et al., decided in 2013.14 By comparing the court’s decision
and subsequent scholarship on the case to the transcript of Prince’s seven-hour deposition, this
chapter illustrates the false foundation of Prince’s landmark victory as it relates to the legal
concept of “transformation.”15 The predominant reading of this case, based upon the Second
Circuit court’s interpretation of Prince’s 2008 series Canal Zone, suggests that Prince’s work
was transformative despite his artistic intentions and his lack of cooperation with the legal
process. The court seeks—and ultimately finds—an indication of conceptual transformation in
Prince’s work, repeatedly using the words “meaning” and “message,”16 despite the artist’s
insistence that he had no such intentions. This investigation overlooks, however, other statements
in the deposition which repeatedly emphasize the physically and visually transformative
artmaking process to which Prince had subjected Cariou’s photographs. Writings by prominent
scholars in this field, including Buskirk and Adler, exhibit a similar oversight. Both authors cite
misleading and ambiguous passages from Prince’s testimony, the same ones included in the court
decision, to support their arguments that the artist did not provide any valuable statements of
intent. Neither scholar cites the deposition. While Prince may not have intended to change the
“meaning” or “message” of his source material, his deposition is a record of his willing, albeit
lengthy and convoluted, participation in the theatricality of the legal process.
14

Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2nd Cir. 2013).

15

“Transformation,” discussed further in the first chapter, is a term applied to the first factor of fair use to determine
whether a secondary work has “a further purpose or different character” from its source. See United States
Copyright Office, “Fair Use Index,” last updated June 2021, https://www.copyright.gov/fair-use/index.html.
16

Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2nd Cir. 2013) at 11.
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Chapter Two draws attention to the 2021 Second Circuit case Andy Warhol Foundation
for the Visual Arts v. Goldsmith to illuminate the shortcomings of the fourth factor of fair use in
an analysis of the art market.17 Through an investigation of the behaviors of informed observers
and the smaller community of knowledgeable buyers, this chapter argues that one artwork—or in
this case, a series of artworks—will rarely cause significant market harm to another. Very little
substantive writing on this case exists, though the 2021 decision shocked art historians and legal
professionals alike.18 One section of the decision stands out to its critics. The court acknowledges
that Warhol’s 1984 Prince Series displays a “distinct aesthetic sensibility” from the source
image, Lynn Goldsmith’s 1981 photograph of the singer Prince for Newsweek, but discredits the
role that this difference plays among both viewers and buyers.19 Building upon lawyer and art
historian Joan Kee’s modification of the “ordinary observer” test in her 2012 article
“Connoisseurship and its Potential in Matters of Copyright,” this chapter investigates where and
how artistic connoisseurship might affect first and fourth factors of fair use. 20
This chapter also addresses the intersection of Prince’s growing fame and the already
well-established artistic brand that has driven the market for Warhol’s work throughout his
career. Multiple texts support the argument that the art market’s interest in the artist-as-brand is
not unique to Warhol. Charles W. Smith’s observations of buyer behaviors in his 1938 book
Auctions: The Social Construction of Value align with present-day valuation guidelines.21 In

17

Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts v. Goldsmith, 992 F.3d 99 (2nd Cir. 2021).
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This case had been active for several years by this time; Goldsmith sued the Andy Warhol Foundation in 2016.
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Not to be confused with Richard Prince, the artist discussed in the previous chapter.
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Joan Kee, “Connoisseurship and its Potential in Matters of Copyright,” Law Culture and the Humanities 8, no. 2
(2012).
21

Charles W. Smith, Auctions: The Social Construction of Value, reprint (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1990; orig. published 1938).
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addition, Adler’s 2018 article “Why Art Does Not Need Copyright” introduces the concept of the
“norm of authenticity” in a self-regulating contemporary art market; Adler argues that the fourth
factor of fair use serves no functional purpose in the visual arts.22 While courts cannot be
expected to make comparative aesthetic judgements about the work of two artists, a form of
quantifiable connoisseurship can be found in market analysis.
Chapter Three recounts the history of art, activism, and law that foregrounds David
Wojnarowicz v. American Family Association and Donald E. Wildmon, a 1990 case decided in
the Southern District of New York. Unlike the previous two chapters, this case does not involve
an infringing artwork. Instead, it concerns a pamphlet by Donald Wildmon of the American
Family Association that condemns the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA), using small
details of Wojnarowicz’s work in the 1990 retrospective Tongues of Flame as examples of the
“offensive” homoerotic material that has appeared in NEA-funded exhibitions. This dispute has
largely faded into obscurity since its resolution, rarely addressed outside short acknowledgments
in articles and biographies about Wojnarowicz. While this chapter relies heavily upon art lawyer
Vilis R. Inde’s detailed explanation of the case in his book Art in the Courtroom, his description
is only an objective overview of the facts and immediate context of the case.23 The broader
issues at stake in this case are tied to a longer history of activism surrounding the AIDS
epidemic, NEA funding, artists’ rights, and moral rights, all of which shaped Wojnarowicz’s
choice to sue Wildmon.24

22

Amy Adler, “Why Art Does Not Need Copyright,” George Washington Law Review 86, no. 2 (2018).

23

Vilis R. Inde, Art in the Courtroom (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998).

24

“Moral rights” refers to the bundle of rights an artist might retain over their work after it has been transferred to a
new owner, such as the freedom to change, remove, destroy, or renounce authorship of an artwork. In
Wojnarowicz’s case, the largest moral rights concern surrounded the misrepresentation of the artist’s images and
message.

9

Of particular interest in this case is the intersection of copyright and moral rights in
artists’ exploration of control over their images. Because Wojnarowicz pursued both copyright
and moral rights laws, attorney Sarah Leggin suggests in one of the few scholarly texts on this
case that both claims might be stronger if they could be collapsed into one. Adler, however,
acknowledges in “Why Art Does Not Need Copyright” that copyright law has already become a
vehicle for moral rights claims. Overall, these lingering moral rights concerns echo decades of
activism surrounding art, politics, and health.
These chapters do not aim to resolve the many issues with the interpretation of copyright
and fair use in the visual arts, and they certainly do not argue for the abolition of these laws.
Instead, each chapter is an investigation of the nuances within our seemingly clear-cut copyright
system, highlighting the unique issues that arise at the intersection of art and law. In Is it Ours?,
Buskirk writes, “When conflicts of this type reach the point where the issues have been
translated into opposing legal briefs, it is easy to lose sight of deeper issues related to shared
cultural reference points.”25 This thesis identifies only a few of these deeper issues that might be
found in the details of individual artistic practice, the conditions of connoisseurship and sales in
the contemporary art market, or the political and artistic advocacy that shapes how and why an
artist might choose to initiate a lawsuit.

25

Martha Buskirk, Is it Ours? Art, Copyright, and Public Interest (Oakland: University of California Press, 2021),
72.
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Chapter One: Appropriation and Transformation in Cariou v. Prince
Originality is a troublesome concept in the United States copyright system. Within this
system, originality is loosely measured in degrees of creativity, a rather abstract approach to an
already-abstract concept. The United States Copyright Office states that “works are original
when they are independently created by a human author and have a minimal degree of creativity.
… The Supreme Court has said that to be creative, a work must have a ‘spark’ and ‘modicum’ of
creativity.”1 Because the amount of creativity that constitutes a “minimal degree” is not broadly
quantifiable, the work of appropriation artists may appear at first glance to be a direct challenge
to our copyright system. To intentionally use an existing image in the creation of a new artwork
certainly implicates copyright considerations, particularly in rephotographs, but not all acts of
appropriation are necessarily the antithesis to the functions of copyright. As with any other
genre, no two artists are alike, and so there subsequently exists a broad spectrum of strategies of
appropriation. This chapter explores the nuances of artistic practice within the genre of
appropriation art, with a particular focus on the recent work of Richard Prince. In contrast to the
work of previous scholars, including Martha Buskirk and Amy Adler, this chapter closely
engages with Prince’s deposition in the case Patrick Cariou v. Richard Prince, et al. to
illuminate how the legal concept of “transformation” has developed in copyright case law around
the visual arts.
Cariou (I refer to the case through this abbreviated title from here on in) ranks among the
most well-known fair use cases in the visual arts. The facts, in short, concern French
photographer Patrick Cariou’s 2000 photobook Yes Rasta, from which Prince used many

1

United States Copyright Office, “What is Copyright?,” accessed December 14, 2021,
https://www.copyright.gov/what-is-copyright/.
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photographs as raw material in the formation of his 2008 series Canal Zone. The series was
exhibited that year at Gagosian, a contemporary art gallery in New York. Cariou initiated a
copyright infringement lawsuit against Prince and Gagosian in 2009, and the events of the case
continued to develop over a period of several years. The Southern District of New York
(S.D.N.Y.) ruled in favor of Cariou in 2011, a decision which Prince appealed, leading to a
reversal of the district court’s decision in the Second Circuit court in 2013. The sheer volume of
artworks involved in this case is unusual: each court had to individually address thirty Canal
Zone paintings in total.2 The circuit court found that twenty-five of these artworks made fair use
of Cariou’s photographs, while five were sent back to the S.D.N.Y. for reconsideration.3 The
Canal Zone series and the subsequent lawsuit continue to draw significant attention to Prince’s
creative practice, particularly how and why he chooses to manipulate images. Prince’s eventual
victory in this case was meaningful, particularly for appropriation artists, but the court’s decision
and subsequent scholarship have falsely declared a lack of transformative intent on Prince’s part.
Prince’s victory in 2013 marked a landmark case for appropriation artists, though the
reversal of the 2011 decision upon appeal is also a testament to the uncertainty of fair use
disputes, as cases like this one are often appealed. Cariou caught the attention of the art world
from the beginning, and its recognition only grew as the events continued to unfold, gathering
increasingly vocal support for Prince from art historians, curators, and other experts along the
way. This support even extended to the courtroom itself, as art professionals recognized the high
stakes of the result. In addition to the testimony Prince’s team submitted from experts, a
staggering number of institutions submitted or signed amicus briefs in order to bring the broader

2

I refer to the artworks in Canal Zone as paintings and collages interchangeably, as Prince did the same throughout
this case.
3

Cariou and Prince reached a private settlement regarding the five remaining artworks in 2014.
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implications of the case to the court’s attention. These institutions included the Andy Warhol
Foundation, the Robert Rauschenberg Foundation, the Association of Art Museum Directors, the
Art Institute of Chicago, the Indianapolis Museum of Art, the Metropolitan Museum of Art, the
Museum of Modern Art, the Los Angeles County Museum of Art, the New Museum, the
Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation, the Walker Art Center, and the Whitney Museum of
American Art. Adler, an art law professor at New York University, describes this dispute as “the
most urgent art law case of the last decade” in her 2016 essay “Fair Use and the Future of Art.”4
The significance of Cariou was not lost on the art world, and the case has continued to appear
frequently in contemporary scholarship.
Despite the widespread attention paid to Cariou for over a decade among legal experts, in
the media, and in academic scholarship, as well as the strong support for Prince, the Second
Circuit decision and secondary scholarship on this case are, I would argue, built upon a false
foundation. This is not to say that Prince’s victory was not deserved, but instead that he won for
reasons that do not accurately reflect the facts that Prince himself offered to the court. Texts that
address this case today generally observe the significance of Cariou for its precedent-setting
interpretation of the legal concept of “transformation.” In a determination of fair use, the first
factor establishes “the purpose and character of the use,” which is more likely to be considered
fair if the secondary artwork is a “transformative” use that “add[s] something new” to its source
with “a further purpose or different character.”5 Since the mid-1990s, courts have often
determined this type of transformation by searching for a shift in “meaning” or “message,”

4

Adler, “Fair Use and the Future of Art,” 561.
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United States Copyright Office, “Fair Use Index,” last updated June 2021, https://www.copyright.gov/fairuse/index.html.
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which the Cariou court tied to “the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and
understandings.”6
Among the strongest precedents set in the 2013 Cariou decision is the idea that the
secondary artist does not have to intentionally comment upon their source material for their work
to be found a transformative form of fair use. The Second Circuit makes note of its disregard for
Prince’s own statements:
It is not surprising that, when transformative use is at issue, the alleged infringer would
go to great lengths to explain and defend his use as transformative. Prince did not do so
here. However, the fact that Prince did not provide those sorts of explanations in his
deposition—which might have lent strong support to his defense—is not dispositive.
What is critical is how the work in question appears to the reasonable observer, not
simply what an artist might say about a particular piece or body of work. Prince’s work
could be transformative even without commenting on Cariou’s work or on culture, and
even without Prince’s stated intention to do so.7
In citing Prince’s lack of message or commentary, the court reinforced that “transformation” is
not a matter of the material changes the artist made to Cariou’s photographs, but rather requires
an investigation of conceptual intent and surface-level observation. The existing literature on
Cariou similarly offers no in-depth engagement with Prince’s physical manipulation of art
objects and images. While the Second Circuit’s decision briefly considered the immediate visual
differences between the artworks, the “transformation” standard that drives fair use conclusions
like this one does not account for the diverse forms of visual and physical transformation that
artists might employ during the process of creating an artwork.

6

Castle Rock Entertainment Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, 150 F.3d at 142, quoted in Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d
694 (2nd Cir. 2013) at 12. Second Circuit judge Pierre N. Leval first made this statement in a 1990 law review
article on fair use; see Pierre N. Leval, “Toward a Fair Use Standard,” Harvard Law Review 103, no. 5 (1990):
1111.
7

The objective of this chapter is to demonstrate that Prince did, quite intentionally, provide transformative
explanations. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2nd Cir. 2013) at pg. 14.
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Multiple scholars in both art and law, following the Second Circuit’s lead, have
characterized Prince as an artist who not only lacked transformative intent, but also as one who
was entirely uncooperative during the legal process. These arguments are based upon a
misunderstanding of the facts and the creation of the Canal Zone paintings themselves. The
absence of critical passages, which this chapter presents, from Prince’s deposition in the 2011
and 2013 decisions suggests that the artist’s explanations of his own work did not contribute to
his case in any meaningful way. Art historians and legal scholars alike have continued to
reinforce this misconception in their own texts, which have often ignored or rejected Prince’s
testimony. This common approach to the case, which started in the court and persists in
secondary literature, places the artist’s deposition squarely and remarkably at odds with his legal
team’s successful fair use defense.
Buskirk, a professor of art history and criticism at Montserrat College of Art, specializes
in copyright and authorship issues. “The Appropriation Game,” the second chapter of her 2021
book Is It Ours? Art, Copyright, and Public Interest, details the recent copyright landscape
surrounding appropriation art and the fair use defense. Her description of the “roller-coaster
fortunes of Richard Prince” in Cariou focuses on the transformative standard clarified in the
2013 decision.8 Her concept of transformation is, like the court’s, based purely on the search for
meaning and message, with no acknowledgement of Prince’s actual process in creating the
paintings. This reading of Cariou is typical, with a focus on changes in context and a rejection of
Prince’s own testimony, about which she writes only briefly, with no direct citation of the
deposition. Buskirk attributes Prince’s victory to the various amicus briefs that argued for
transformation in a way that Prince’s testimony supposedly did not:
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Another crucial aspect of the decision was its de-emphasis of statements of intent— and
it is indeed striking how reluctant Prince was to play along with the process, refusing to
provide accessible explanations. … Regarding the “message” of Graduation, Prince
testified: “He’s playing the guitar now, it looks like he’s playing the guitar, it looks as if
he’s always played the guitar, that’s what my message was.”9 However, others attempted
to fill this breach, including the relatively unusual submission of amicus briefs in
conjunction with the district court reconsideration. A joint brief by the Warhol and
Rauschenberg Foundations argued for an expansive understanding of transformative use
that would go beyond questions of visible differences to take into account changes in
context.10
The amicus brief by the Warhol and Rauschenberg Foundations similarly did not focus on the
actual practice of artmaking that led to this case, but instead encouraged the court to consider
testimony or evidence from experts in the art world who might have guided the court’s decision.
Both foundations submitted that “the Court has yet to consider key additional evidence on this
issue from artists, scholars, critics, market participants, and other such persons, who may assist
the Court in determining whether there exists a reasonable observer who would perceive new
meaning or message in Prince’s paintings.”11 Without full access to Prince’s testimony, the key
takeaways during and after the 2013 Cariou decision are flawed due to this excessive focus on
finding new meaning.
Even Adler, who describes herself as “most unapologetically Team Richard Prince” to
the point that his legal team had asked her to consult on the appeal to the Second Circuit, argues
several years after the fact that “the transformative inquiry asks precisely the wrong questions
about contemporary art. It requires courts to search for ‘meaning’ and ‘message’ when one goal
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of so much current art is to throw the idea of stable meaning into play.”12 Like Buskirk, she does
not cite Prince’s deposition directly, though she mentions it repeatedly, citing only the quotes
that appear in the court decision. Her critique of transformation in fair use highlights the
difficulty, perhaps even the impossibility, of consistently finding a new meaning or message, but
she does not investigate other forms of transformation, such as aesthetic changes, that are crucial
to a thorough analysis of visual art. Rather than suggesting an expansion of the boundaries of
transformative use, Adler questions the necessity of the standard in the first place, and eventually
suggests abandoning it altogether due to its inconsistency in practice.13 This deconstructive
approach to various facets of copyright is typical of her writing, as we see again in the next
chapter.
The concept of “transformation” in a legal context has departed so significantly from the
realities of artmaking that scholars like Buskirk and Adler, who specialize in visual arts issues,
have bypassed any discussion of the differences between the artworks themselves.
Unsurprisingly, critics of Prince’s victory also rely upon the misconception that the artist refused
to provide any indication of transformation in his work. Michael E. Jones, an artist and legal
studies professor at the University of Massachusetts Lowell, writes in his 2016 book Art Law that
“the court completely ignored Prince’s inability to articulate the reason or purpose behind his
‘transformative’ art,” which Jones claims was created in “bad faith.”14 These scholars make valid
arguments regarding the inconsistency of the first factor of fair use, but their lack of engagement
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with Prince’s lengthy deposition, an incredibly informative document for any author who
analyzes this case, only allows them to address conceptual transformations over and over again.
The greatest oversight by all of these authors is their lack of engagement with the full
content of Prince’s deposition. Despite suggestions to the contrary from the courts themselves,
and in writings by Buskirk, Adler, and Jones, Prince was quite cooperative during this case—or
at least exactly as cooperative as he needed to be. Cariou was unusual for Prince in several ways,
including the large number of artworks involved, but most importantly his willing participation
in serious conversation about his artmaking strategies, including his motivations and justification
for appropriation. In Prince’s deposition, he offered hours of what appears to be straightforward,
in-depth insight into his work that proved the necessity of an expanded concept of transformation
in fair use disputes for artists. In this particular case, it is also critical to an accurate
understanding of the transformative nature of Canal Zone and Prince’s work overall.
Many documents from Cariou, including the deposition, are quite difficult for the public
to find. They are accessible, in theory, on the Public Access to Court Electronic Records
(PACER) website, but even there they are trapped behind a paywall and scattered across a
variety of separate documents.15 Greg Allen, the artist and critic behind the blog greg.org, filled
this gap in research and access with his 2011 book Canal Zone Richard Prince YES RASTA:
Selected Court Documents from Cariou v. Prince.16 He noted that he undertook this project to
provide a valuable art historical resource on Prince:
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I must acknowledge, if only in this footnote, the comically long title of this book. Greg Allen, Canal Zone
Richard Prince YES RASTA: Selected Court Documents from Cariou v. Prince et al, including The Videotaped
Deposition of Richard Prince, The Affidavit of Richard Prince, Competing Memoranda of Law in Support of
Summary Judgement, Exhibits Pertaining to Paintings and Collages of Richard Prince and The Use of
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It’s always bugged me when I read a news story about a legal case, or a scientific report,
and there’s no link to the original source material. And since I’ve been quoting from them
a lot lately, I have been fielding a lot of requests for copies of the court filings and
transcripts in the Patrick Cariou vs. Richard Prince & Gagosian case.
It was yesterday afternoon, though, when I was sending my fourth email [or eighth, since
the attachments are so big] that I realized Richard Prince’s deposition is not only the
longest interview he’s ever given, it’s probably the longest interview he’ll ever give. … I
mean, seriously, the guy talked for seven hours. Under oath. In insane detail about his
work, process, and ideas.17
The deposition covered not just the creation of Canal Zone, but Prince’s entire career up to that
point as well. Presuming the relative sincerity of the artistic statements made under oath,
however exasperating some of them may be, this deposition directly contradicts the prevailing
legal and scholarly view of Prince’s role in this case.
Court documents like this one are a unique type of primary source in art history. Legal
disputes are a theatrical process, in which each word is carefully arranged to tell just the right
story, each deposition and testimony a performance of a script meticulously devised by the
speaker and their attorneys. The delivery of these statements under a legally binding oath of
truth—something not typically required in an interview for an art magazine or an exhibition
catalogue, for example—only increases the importance of using just the right words to spin a
story in one’s favor. Based on his statements in the seven-hour deposition, Prince was clearly
aware of the role he plays in the theater of Cariou. Likely coached to do so by his own team and
aware of the importance of the transformation, the artist told Cariou’s attorneys a carefully
crafted story of transformative process, though this was not the story they were looking for.

Reproductions of Patrick Cariou’s YES RASTA Photographs Therein, And The Summary Ass Whooping Dealt to
Richard Prince By the Hon. Judge Deborah A. Batts, as compiled and revised by Greg Allen for greg.org in April
2011 (Washington, DC: Greg.org, April 2011).
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Prince’s testimony, typically regarded as a meandering and frustrating rejection of meaning and
message, should instead be read more closely as a career-long recollection of transformative
image manipulations.
Throughout his prolonged interview with Dan Brooks and Eric Boden, Cariou’s
attorneys, Prince described his use of pre-existing images as raw material, frequently using the
term “transform” or “transformation” to clarify his methods throughout the preceding several
decades of his artistic practice.18 Early in the deposition, when asked whether he rephotographed
a photo by Garry Gross in 1983, Prince responded, “I didn’t rephotograph a photo by him. I
rephotographed an image that appeared in a little advertising booklet that he had selfpublished.”19 This type of statement is typical for Prince, an appropriation artist who views
others’ images, particularly photographs, as basic resources like paint or clay rather than preexisting artworks. In reference to advertising images in his earlier work, for example, Prince
remarked in an interview that “they were like these authorless pictures, too good to be true.”20An
image and a reproduction, to Prince, were already entirely different objects.
In describing the creation of Canal Zone, Prince refuted the opposition’s assumptions that
his paintings were low-effort creations lifted directly from the pages of Cariou’s book:
Q [Brooks]: In creating the works that were in the Canal Zone show isn’t it a fact that you
scanned some of Plaintiff’s images directly onto the canvas?
A [Prince]: No. …
Q: Did somebody do that at your request? …
A: What I would do is send – after I tore the image out of the book –
Q: You’re talking about Plaintiff’s book?
A: Yes. I would send it off to a commercial lab. And I believe it’s called inkjet process.
18
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Q: Right.
A: Now, I don’t know too much about it except that it – you’re able to reproduce in
almost any scale onto different surfaces. The surface which I chose was canvas.
Q: Right. And the name of the lab that you used?
A: NancyScans.21
This first step, even though Prince outsourced it, marked another degree of removal from
Cariou’s photographs. By sending the reproductions to an inkjet lab for resizing and reprinting,
Prince had already started to transform his source material. Brooks later asked Prince, “Is
appropriating images from other people, does that also make your job easier in creating a new
image?,” to which Prince responded, “No. Not really, no.”22 Prince made it quite clear during his
deposition that his artworks required his time, effort, and money, despite Brooks’s suggestions to
the contrary. In addition, the images that Prince sent to NancyScans are his own collages, made
not only from Cariou’s photographs but from other found images:
Q [Brooks]: Well, in this case what do you mean by collage?
A [Prince]: It means I ripped out a reproduction from a book or a magazine and cut it up,
pasted it, scotch taped, and then mounted it on a piece of white paper and drew some
dimensions, 60 inches wide and–
Q: So it could be enlarged?
A: So it could be enlarged – yeah, I mean I just say 60, yes, various sizes.23
The gap between Cariou and Prince’s works continued to widen with each collaging, enlarging,
and reprinting. Even after this series of transformations, Prince continued to add material to the
canvases that returned from NancyScans. Prince and Brooks examined a detail of one Canal
Zone painting, labeled C118 and titled Back to the Garden (Figure 1):
A [Prince]: You know, the tonality here is quite different. And this was a – I mean this
collage was sent out to NancyScans.
Q [Brooks]: Right.
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A: And then came back, as I believe, on a fairly large canvas, which I then cut up the
canvas. These strips, as you see them here –
MR. HAYES [Prince’s attorney]: Referring to 118.
A: This image was transferred to canvas and then I cut the canvas again in strips and I
squeegeed it. That was the new technique. That’s what made this painting very exciting
for me to paint because I couldn’t control the amount of paint that would come out from
behind the collage.24
Prince was referring to the image of the Rastafarian man seated on a donkey slightly to the left of
center in Back to the Garden, which he had cut into three strips and applied to the canvas print
using a layer of white paint as an adhesive which seeps through the cracks between the strips and
obscures a slightly larger version of the same scene behind it. Some of the excess paint appears
in lines and flecks atop the strips as if Prince has flung or laid down his squeegee midway
through the process. Brooks and Prince continued to discuss the artist’s use of paint, this time
over the other three figures in the collage:
Q: I don’t understand. How is this a painting, that’s what I want to know, C118, in what
way is it a painting as opposed to a scanned photograph? …
A: I understand, but I just explained it. You want me to explain it again?
Q: Did you paint the nose and the eyes and the ears and the beard? …
A: I painted on the nose and the eyes and the ears.
Q: Okay. So you took the photograph–
A: And I also painted the eyes and the nose and the mouth on the women. But to answer
your question, yes, it’s – on 118 this is a painting. The process, you have to understand,
inkjet is four colors. Paint is mixed and it’s blown out on canvas. It’s a completely
different type of texture when I receive it. And then what I do is I start to paint again.
That’s why you see all this paint underneath the image and on the image. I don’t know
how else to explain it.25
Here Prince finally laid out the remaining steps of his transformation process. Though Cariou’s
Yes Rasta images are still recognizable in Canal Zone artworks like Back to the Garden, Prince
has manipulated them enough times to establish a new layer of authorship over them.
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Throughout his deposition, Prince also identified other types of transformation that
occurred in his practice. In a discussion of Prince’s other work, Brooks questioned whether
Prince would take issue with another artist attempting to sell a copy of his 2005 photograph
Spiritual America IV. Prince indicated his indifference, suggesting that it had even already been
done.26 He told Brooks, “And art is about freedom. If I was restricted then I couldn’t transform
these images.”27 After the discussion returns to Canal Zone, Brooks and Prince began to look
through specific images. As he and Brooks discussed Exhibit 13, Ding Dong the Witch is Dead
(Figure 2), Prince began to note Canal Zone’s references to significant works from art history
such as, in the case of Exhibit 13, Manet’s Le Déjeuner sur l’herbe and Cézanne’s bathers. He
considered these formal connections a type of transformation in themselves:
Q [Brooks]: So correct me if I’m wrong, but are you saying that these, some of these
Canal Zone paintings were a tribute – I’ll say tribute instead of homage – to Picasso, De
Kooning, and Cézanne? …
A [Prince]: Well, I’m really interested in making art that, you know, transforms
something that’s already existed without getting involved in the original intent of the
image. I like to – I want to transform the existing image. And by doing, by quoting, or in
the style of Picasso or in the style of De Kooning, or even thinking about the composition
of Cézanne’s bathers, it was a way in which I could transform [the Yes Rasta] images,
yes.28
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These distinct references to the canon of art history align with the concept of “further purpose”
that the Copyright Office includes in its explanation of transformation. Prince did add something
new to Cariou’s photographs, then, not in terms of message but rather in terms of form.
Prince used this extended interview to demonstrate that he intentionally transformed his
source material, repeatedly widening the artistic distance between his own paintings and
Cariou’s photographs. Despite considering Cariou’s images and reproductions to be entirely
different materials already, Prince made the choice to continue sending the reproductions
through further transformations. To summarize the quoted sections of his testimony, Prince
began his series of manipulations by choosing reproductions of Cariou’s photographs from the
Yes Rasta book, added collaged elements such as a guitar, and sent these collages to a
commercial inkjet printing lab to be resized and reprinted on canvas. After the canvases returned
to his studio, he made further alterations to some of them, cutting them into strips, squeegeeing
them onto another surface with a layer of paint to create a new texture, and painting various
lozenge-shaped features onto the figures from the photographs. A number of these works contain
intentional references to major artists of previous generations. Above all, these paintings differ
completely from Cariou’s photographs in material and process, even if the final product still
shares significant visual similarities. While Prince did not describe a change in message during
his deposition, he did not need to do so. He sufficiently clarified the transformative nature of his
work in terms of material and process, using the term “transformation” as well as specific
descriptions of his additions to the source material. Prince literally, physically added something
new to each image he borrowed from Yes Rasta. To suggest that these works are not
transformative, or that Prince had no transformative intent, is to overlook the long sequence of
processes involved in the creation of Canal Zone, a sequence which Prince’s legal team had no
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doubt coached him to emphasize using specific language. In a sense, Prince completed one last
transformation by modifying his own explanations of artistic intent to better align with the goals
of the defense. In his deposition he was both an artist and an actor, carefully choosing the words
that will best shape the court’s understanding of his creative process.
What, then, has led the S.D.N.Y., Second Circuit, and various art law scholars to believe
that Prince’s deposition was not helpful to his case? First is the fact that those who have access to
the deposition tend to read it selectively, searching for statements on meaning or message, which
most authors consider to be essential to this case. A small handful of specific statements have
been used as evidence of Prince’s lack of transformative intent due to his rejection of meaning,
including the aforementioned quote cited in both Buskirk and Adler’s texts: “He’s playing the
guitar now, it looks like he’s playing the guitar, it looks as if he’s always played the guitar, that’s
what my message was.”29 It is certainly a puzzling claim—Adler speculates about what Prince’s
attorney must have said, proving that she does not know the context of this quote within the
larger interview—but not one that defines Prince’s intentions.30 A 2011 article in the New York
Times even cites Allen’s book but, like Adler and Buskirk, still only incorporates passages that
do not reflect Prince’s transformative intent. In one cited quote, for instance, Brooks asked
Prince point-blank what his message is and Prince responded, “The message is to make great art
that makes people feel good.”31 Prince made many similarly vague comments throughout his
deposition, but they should not be approached as statements of artistic intent or, in this case, a
lack thereof. Prince had nothing of significance to say about the meaning or message of Canal
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Zone when asked because, from his perspective and that of his attorneys, his artistic process
itself was adequately transformative.
Other popular quotes, cited directly in the 2011 and 2013 decisions, are frequently used
to argue that Prince’s work in general, and Canal Zone more specifically, lack deliberate
transformation; the artist remarked at various points in his testimony that he “do[es]n’t really
have a message,” that he was not “trying to create anything with a new meaning or a new
message,” and that he “d[id]n’t have any … interest in [Cariou’s] original intent.”32 The Second
Circuit decision included all of these passages. The significance of Prince’s extraordinarily long
testimony is lost in this selective citation of quotes that relate only to meaning or message,
leading the S.D.N.Y. and Second Circuit not to consider the literal, physical transformations
through which Cariou’s imagery had gone to arrive in the final Canal Zone series. This portrayal
of Prince, as an enigmatic character who carelessly borrows images without any concern for his
own role as an artist, is grossly inaccurate, at least when we take the artist’s testimony into
account.
Additionally, Prince’s reputation as a cryptic or uncooperative personality led to several
suggestions that the artist did not speak truthfully in his interview with the attorneys, despite
giving it under oath. For instance, one of Cariou’s attorneys reminded Prince during the
deposition that his answers should be truthful, despite having already spoken with the artist for
two hours; in a moment of clear annoyance with some of Prince’s responses, Brooks stated, “So
in this deposition I will ask you to do your best to give us the actual truth instead of like what
somebody might imagine the truth could be.”33 This discrediting of Prince’s own statements in
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the early stages of the lawsuit shows the negative light in which Cariou’s team likely continued
to describe Prince throughout this case. Attacking Prince’s credibility in court would not have
been a difficult task for Cariou’s attorneys, considering that Prince had spent his career thus far
building a complex relationship with truth. In a 2008 letter published in Artforum, Prince wrote,
“Paint it white. I’m a liar. And I cheat too. I make things up and can’t be trusted. It’s not my
fault.” The artist partially attributed this personality to his parents’ reluctance to tell him their
jobs; Prince claimed to have learned when he was a teenager that both were federal intelligence
officers.34 Such enigmatic conditions of his upbringing translated easily to an adult career as, in
the words of art critic Jerry Saltz, an “unreliable narrator.”35 In his artistic practice, too, Prince
has often played with truth and lies, particularly surrounding the imagery and messaging in
advertising and other forms of contemporary media. Through the practice of appropriation,
Prince has tested the stability of original authorship over such material, borrowing images from
other creators and renewing them as his own in a kind of lie by omission, removing any
reference to the “original” author.
Years after the conclusion of Cariou, Adler’s article suggests that we should read
Prince’s deposition not as truthful testimony, but as an artwork in its own right. Prince, Adler
argues, has already “cultivated a mythical self-narrative that blends truth and lies,” preferring to
hide his true authorial intent.36 Though she argues that an artist’s intent is irrelevant to the
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creation of meaning, it is challenging to dismiss Prince’s testimony as “irrelevant” because the
artmaking process he describes is visible in each artwork. In his deposition, Prince did not
describe what he meant, but instead what he made. He had no reason to lie about how he created
each painting, as each layer of physical transformation is clearly visible upon inspection.
Finally, Prince’s intentional manipulations of Cariou’s photographs may hold no weight
in these texts if the legal definition of transformation does not include the types of actions Prince
described in his deposition. Courts are generally reluctant to expand the scope of a law like fair
use because such a decision sets a precedent that affects any future cases, not only in the visual
arts but in other media such as music or computer code. Because Prince was able to win his case
within the bounds of the current definition of transformation—despite the court’s understanding
that his transformations were not intentional—the court would have seen no reason to further
expand the scope of fair use. Buskirk notes the inconsistency that results when judges are
required to make aesthetic assessments. Comparing two images, Back to the Garden and Charlie
Company (Figure 3), Buskirk observes that, despite their similar compositional strategies and use
of the same Rastafarian image, only one was decisively ruled a transformative fair use. Though it
led to Prince’s victory, Buskirk argues, allowing even this degree of aesthetic acknowledgement
in court can become risky.37 Even though Prince provides his own arguments, over-reliance on
statements of intent can become tricky when the final decision falls upon those who already seek
a different, more ideational type of transformative purpose, such as satire or social commentary.
In addition, Adler argues that Prince’s testimony may have been unclear:
Prince failed to testify about his transformative intent in a way that was palatable to the
courts. Thus the Prince court had to struggle directly with this question left open by
[Blanch v. Koons, 2006]: how to evaluate whether there is transformative meaning in
cases where an artist didn’t spoon feed the court a statement of transformative purpose?
37
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Artists’ statements of intent had made it easy. Prince’s testimony (or at least the court’s
interpretation of it) made his case hard.38
In a footnote to this statement, she admits incredibly briefly that “the district court overlooked
statements by Prince that could have been interpreted as showing transformative intent” but
never makes mention of these statements or allows them any weight in her argument.39 Despite
her overall denial of Prince’s cooperation, Adler acknowledges the importance of playing along
with the theatricality of a lawsuit, noting that Jeff Koons’s cooperation led him to a victory in the
2006 case Blanch v. Koons that he was unable to achieve in 1992 with Rogers v. Koons:
[M]ost important, in the years between Rogers v. Koons and Blanch v. Koons, Koons had
learned how to testify in a way that pleased the court. … Now Koons himself gave the
court exactly what it wanted. In the years leading up to Blanch, the Second Circuit had
said the question of transformative use boiled down to this: did the secondary work use
the first to impart ‘new insights and understandings?’” And lo and behold, look at what
Koons said about his purpose and meaning during his deposition: ‘I want the viewer to
think about … these images … and gain new insight’ into them. Sure enough his use was
found to be transformative. The artist said the magic words.40
Perhaps Prince did not say the magic words after all. His deposition lacked evidence of
conceptual transformation, the primary object of the courts’ inquiries, but the types of
transformations that he did emphasize are not unique to his own practice. While a change or
expansion of the doctrine of fair use should not be taken lightly, the inclusion of the actual
process of artmaking, especially when its result is readily visible, would allow courts and
scholars alike to better examine the visual and conceptual aspects of artworks in equal measure.
Existing interpretations of Cariou have contributed to a pattern of legal and scholarly
neglect of the details of physical and visual transformation in artmaking, especially in
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appropriation art. In a genre already at a legal disadvantage due to its inherent risk of copyright
infringement, the series of visual and physical changes involved in many works of appropriation
art have been frequently overlooked by judges and art law scholars alike. The use of another’s
image, in the eyes of the law, may not constitute the same degree of artistic creativity, and as
such observers have often failed to pay adequate attention to the processes through which works
such as Canal Zone were made. This disregard of the physical and visual particularities of the
artmaking process is due in part to the judicial misconception that appropriation artists lack
creativity, genius, or skill, qualities which can grant their work greater artistic legitimacy within
the copyright system.41 This perspective can lead to the conclusion that artists like Prince have
not invested enough effort into their artworks to earn the rewards of copyright, such as the right
to sell, exhibit, or distribute their work without restrictions.
Intellectual property scholar Michael Spence terms this phenomenon “reaping without
sowing,” in which one person benefits from the use of another’s work without permission. He
argues that such an action is both common and generally harmless, particularly given the long
history of borrowing and imitation in the visual arts. In his essay “Justifying Copyright,” Spence
writes, “To condemn reaping without sowing would be to condemn all imitation and to stifle the
development of artistic traditions. It would be to condemn us to live in a world of selfsufficiency mitigated only by agreement, a world in which few of us either could, or would want
to, live.”42 The acceptability of “reaping without sowing,” however, still differs significantly
between art and law. Because the copyright system still depends on the idea that effort should
41
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equal reward, Prince and his legal team emphasized the time, materials, and labor which Prince
had invested in the creation of Canal Zone. When legal professionals overlook these fundamental
aspects of the artmaking process that still exist in many works of appropriation art, they continue
to deny the legitimacy of this genre in the copyright system despite its mainstream acceptance in
the art world.
The transformative standard itself was still relatively new by the time of the Cariou
decision. The focus on transformations that offered some type of commentary, rather than
physical manipulations of a visible image, was largely due to the nature of the case that
established the standard in the first place: Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, decided in the Supreme Court
in 1994. In this case, Acuff-Rose Music sued the hip-hop group 2 Live Crew for copyright
infringement in response to their parody of the Roy Orbison song “Oh, Pretty Woman.” The
court decided unanimously that 2 Live Crew’s song was fair use, reversing the Sixth Circuit’s
decision that the commercial nature of the parody rendered it presumptively unfair. This case
established the legal definition of “transformative” use: one that “alter[s] the original with new
expression, meaning, or message.” According to the Supreme Court, “the more transformative
the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may
weigh against a finding of fair use.”43 This aspect of the Campbell decision continues to have a
significant effect on the interpretation of the first and fourth factors of fair use.
Copyright infringement cases in appropriation art often draw closely from similar issues
of sampling in the music industry due to the lack of a relevant precedent in the visual arts.44 This
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reliance on cases such as Campbell, however, comes at the expense of purely visual concerns.
Intellectual property lawyer E. Kenly Ames notes in the Columbia Law Review that musical
appropriation functions similarly to literary material, the medium in which copyright finds its
origins. She argues in 1993 that fair use may be adequate for music, but a “visual artist, on the
other hand, must often appropriate an image in its entirety for her work to make sense to the
viewer.”45 When any further determinations of transformative use rely on a definition from
music and not visual art, there is no reason to consider visual manipulations of pre-existing
images as a new form of expression.
The 1992 Second Circuit case Rogers v. Koons is further proof of the fact that the
lingering presence of the artist’s hand in legally contested appropriation works has been largely
overlooked in the courts. This case predated Campbell by two years, and yet the Second Circuit
disregarded Koons’s obvious transformation of Rogers’s photograph exactly as the same court
would in Cariou.46 The result of Rogers demonstrates that the creation of the transformative
standard has not significantly affected the legal reading of visual artworks or the weight given to
an artist’s intent. The artworks involved in this case have become widely recognizable, even
infamous, in the art world as the final decision remains controversial.
In 1984, Rogers licensed his 1980 black-and-white photograph Puppies (Figure 4) to
Museum Graphics for reproduction and sale on a series of notecards. Koons bought one and sent
it, copyright information removed, to a group of artisans in Italy to create a sculpture for his
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upcoming exhibition, The Banality Show.47 The resulting artwork, String of Puppies (Figure 5),
features a modified version of the same subject. The three-dimensional couple’s expressions
appear markedly less enthusiastic than their photographic counterparts. Their eyes, without a lens
to draw their gaze, fixate on differing points far beyond the viewer. Both have flowers in their
hair, perhaps a transposition of the original outdoor setting from which they have been severed.
The puppies are in no better state. Their faces, especially their eyes, have a distinct and
unsettling humanoid quality. Very little resemblance to the puppies in the photograph remains,
apart from their poses and number.
The most striking transformation between the two artworks, however, is Koons’s addition
of intense color, as the original photograph was in black and white. In contrast to the bright
orange, yellow and pink of their owners’ clothing, the puppies have been given an outlandish
blue color with huge, equally unnatural noses. The genial and domestic quality of the original
photograph becomes something else entirely in Koons’s work: unnatural, alien, and vacant,
perfect for inclusion in The Banality Show. These obvious differences between the two objects,
the visual barriers that prevent one from acting as a replacement for the other, dissolved
immediately in the eyes of the court upon the introduction of a note that Koons had sent to his
artisans: “work must be just like photo [sic] — features of photo must be captured.”48 Despite
this statement, String of Puppies is far from a mere copy; even when the court considered the
artist’s intent, the changes in the final object did not adequately convince these viewers that
Koons had created a new work.49
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The suggestion that Koons had created a work that did not alter the expression of
Rogers’s original notecard at all remains controversial, because Rogers sued Koons for copyright
infringement and won.50 Like Prince, Koons’s reputation preceded him, clouding the court’s
perception of his practice; Ames suggests that the court must have “viewed Koons’s conduct
with strong distaste,” noting that they likely believed that Koons had committed an act of
piracy.51 The Second Circuit’s opinion of Koons and his work was made immediately clear in the
introduction of both artists. While Rogers was simply “a 43-year-old professional artistphotographer” who lives off his work, the court described Koons’s background with more
dubious detail:
Defendant Jeff Koons is a 37-year-old artist and sculptor residing in New York City. …
He is a controversial artist hailed by some as a “modern Michelangelo,” while others find
his art “truly offensive.” A New York Times critic complained that “Koons is pushing the
relationship between art and money so far that everyone involved comes out looking
slightly absurd.”52
Adler humorously acknowledges Koons’s reputation, writing that “Jeff Koons (in my view) is
both a great artist and a great gift to art law; he has a dazzling knack for being sued.”53 Ames
notes that, despite obvious shortcomings in the existing copyright law for this type of work,
“almost certainly, the Koons court simply saw very little room for appropriation under existing
copyright law and no compelling justification for expanding the scope of the fair use doctrine.”54
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If not during this case, and not during Cariou, it is unclear if, when, or why a greater
consideration of creatively and visually transformative authorship will ever occur in court.55
The lack of a successful and expansive transformation-based approach to copyright
infringement in the visual arts only continues to reveal a growing pattern of legal disadvantages
for appropriation artists. The active devaluation of Prince’s own testimony—despite his
victory—and Koons’s creation of an object with an entirely new expression both reveal an
ongoing interpretive issue in fair use: the transformative standard, in its current state, does not
adequately address the visual and physical qualities of art objects themselves. While courts
should not form an absolute reliance on statements of intent, an appropriation artist’s testimony
is a uniquely useful aid in navigating the layers of artistic manipulation which separate the
source material and the new artwork by several degrees.
In the Cariou decisions and subsequent literature by Buskirk, Adler, and others, Prince
appears as an enigmatic character whose work manages to carry new meaning despite his
personal artistic apathy towards new additions, but his complete testimony proves that this
approach is altogether inadequate. Prince, in complete cooperation with his attorneys and the
acceptable limits of artistic practice, played his role in this case and offered a growing list of
examples of transformative actions upon Cariou’s photographs. Canal Zone, and String of
Puppies before it, demonstrated a series of manipulations that were just as transformative, just as
demonstrative of authorship, as any form of commentary on the source material. If originality is,
in the most basic legal sense, defined by creativity and effort, it follows that a standard of
transformation could be as well. Encouraging courts to pay greater attention to the words of
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artists (and make this information more readily available to the public) may benefit appropriation
artists in the long term, giving them the option to add new value to their works through either
meaning or medium. As the next chapter argues, an inconsistent approach to stylistic changes
reaches even beyond appropriation art.
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Chapter Two: Art Market Behaviors in Andy Warhol Foundation v. Goldsmith
The economic valuation of artworks is an inherently social construct. From the viewers to
the markets, the determining factor in the sales potential of an artwork is the knowledge and
preferences of the community that surrounds it. As the previous chapter has established,
however, the behaviors of the art world do not always align with contemporary interpretations of
copyright law. Recall the four factors of fair use listed in the introduction of this thesis; in a
determination of fair use, courts examine the possible markets for the works involved in each
case using the fourth factor: “the effect of the use on the potential market for or value of the
work.”1 In such a legal analysis, this market-focused segment of the investigation falls short; as
this chapter discusses, the court system relies almost exclusively on the views of a hypothetical
lay person, an “ordinary observer,” to determine the similarities between two artworks. This
“ordinary observer” test applies not only to aesthetic comparisons, but also to sales comparisons,
consistently leading courts to construct an incomplete market analysis that paints an unrealistic
picture of an allegedly infringing artwork’s effect on sales.
The real conditions of the contemporary art market and those of the hypothetical market
analysis in fair use cases therefore face a great divide. Incorporating the behaviors of viewers and
buyers with deeper knowledge of both art history and the art market, this chapter investigates the
2021 Second Circuit case Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts v. Goldsmith to argue that
the fourth factor of fair use is uniquely ineffective in visual arts cases. In short, current legal
interpretations of this factor do not accurately reflect the likelihood that one artwork, even an
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otherwise infringing one, will damage the sales potential for another artwork in the present-day
art world.
The Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts v. Goldsmith (AWF) decision marks one
of the more recent developments in United States art law.2 In a partial dismissal of the findings in
Cariou v. Prince and similar cases, the court ruled against a finding of fair use in Andy Warhol’s
manipulations of Lynn Goldsmith’s 1981 photograph of the singer Prince for Newsweek (Figure
6). Warhol’s first use of Goldsmith’s photograph was a licensed commission for Vanity Fair in
1984, published alongside an article titled “Purple Fame” (Figure 7). The black-and-white
Goldsmith photograph captures a vulnerable figure at only twenty-three years old, still quite
early in his career in the spotlight, successfully capturing what Goldsmith describes as a
“willing[ness] to bust through what must be [his] immense fears to make the work that [he]
wanted to [make].” The photographer claimed that Prince left the session early, seemingly
“nervous and uncomfortable.”3 Prince sits against a nondescript background that allows the
strong black lines of the material around his neck to join his narrow face and lofty hairstyle in the
tightly enclosed middle third of the frame. Alone in the space and yet trapped within it, the
singer is stripped of the stature his reputation would later bestow on him to become just a solitary
man who stares uncomfortably down the camera lens.
Three years would pass between Goldsmith’s photograph and Warhol’s image for Vanity
Fair. The latter demonstrates the effect of this deceptively short interval upon Prince’s stature in
popular culture. The uneasy young singer that Goldsmith captured in her 1981 photograph is
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missing here, replaced by a figure whose newfound international fame had begun to drive his
identity towards a kind of cultural omnipresence, a reputation which “Purple Fame” highlighted.
In the article, literary critic Leon Wieseltier writing under the pseudonym Tristan Vox, observed
that “escape from Prince is no longer possible. Finally he has arrived. The evidence is
everywhere. The reasons are good. His music is some of the tightest and most tumid rock ‘n’ roll
ever made.”4 The addition of Warhol’s style, recognizable by that time as the Pop Art treatment
that had already touched swaths of mass-media imagery, translates the singer’s image through
layers of social and artistic commodification that combine his growing reputation and Warhol’s
status as art-world royalty.
In this image, Prince is no longer bound by the empty space that encroaches upon his
narrow figure; Warhol has removed the singer’s body and rescaled the image to allow the
singer’s head to command the entirety of the space, some of his hair brushing along the edge of
the page. The thin lines that trace the edges of each shape, slightly out of alignment with the
image, are reminiscent of a vibrant neon sign and its immediate reflection upon the glass of the
window where it hangs. The flattening of the contours in Prince’s angular face and the
conversion of his dynamic hairstyle into a jagged monochromatic field strip Goldsmith’s image
of its most captivating quality: the opportunity to examine the details of the singer’s appearance
and mood. In the pages of Vanity Fair, there is nothing more to see than what Warhol’s image
immediately presents to us. The result is a mask-like monolith, isolated on the page and staring
directly at the reader. Mere inches from the image, a Vanity Fair reader would have encountered
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one of Vox’s incredulous questions: “Is this coarse creature really the favorite of American pop
culture?”5
After the commission for Vanity Fair, Warhol used Goldsmith’s image fifteen more
times, each replication spreading this new image of Prince across color and medium, from
angular neon silk screens to pencil illustrations (Figure 8). Vanity Fair did not inform Goldsmith
that her photograph was to be provided to Warhol. The photographer was also unaware that
Warhol had gone on to produce fifteen additional images of Prince, and she did not discover the
series until 2016, after Prince’s death granted Warhol’s imagery a period of increased publicity.6
Those fifteen unlicensed silkscreens at issue in this case joined the image published alongside
“Purple Fame” to form the sixteen-part “Prince Series.” Each of these derivative images exhibits
the same flat block of hair, manipulated shadows, off-center line drawings, and bold, unnatural
colors as the first. Each is an image of Prince as the media saw him in 1984 and not a moment
earlier.
An artist’s style, especially one so immediately recognizable as Warhol’s, invites a
perceived transfer of authorship from the source imagery to the final product. Recall the
argument presented in Chapter One: in the process of artmaking, a series of visual manipulations
can grant an artwork a new, transformative effect while retaining some visible elements of its
source material. The image in Vanity Fair and its derivatives in the Prince Series exhibit a
similar stylistic removal from Goldsmith’s photograph, despite the remaining formal and
technical similarities that tie Warhol’s work to the 1981 image. By the time of Goldsmith’s
lawsuit, literature on Warhol’s contemporaries had already recognized that an artist’s imposition
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of their own style upon their source material is often the key to recognizable authorship.
Reflecting upon the photographic work of Robert Rauschenberg, for instance, art historian
Douglas Crimp writes, “And what does he find with his camera, what does he see through his
lens, but all these objects in the world that look like passages from his own art. Rauschenberg
thus appropriates his own work, converts it from material to style, and delivers it up in this new
form.”7 Warhol, too, executes a transition from material to style; by visually and conceptually
transforming Goldsmith’s photograph into a series of Pop silkscreens that convey a new effect,
he demonstrates that he can use the Newsweek photograph as raw material.
The Warhol Foundation’s loss in the Second Circuit sparked widespread criticism among
art historians and legal scholars alike, who took their irritations online shortly after the release of
the document on March 26, 2021. On Twitter, Mark Lemley, a law professor at Stanford, wrote
“Really unfortunate,” and art historian Martha Buskirk added a few hours later, “This doesn’t
make sense.”8 Their thread joined a wave of confused and disappointed responses to the verdict,
though very little formal scholarship exists on this case to date. One particularly baffling line of
the Second Circuit decision stands out for its acknowledgement and subsequent disregard of
Warhol’s visual authorship. After viewing the images in the Prince Series, the court writes, “the
Warhol works display the distinct aesthetic sensibility that many would associate with Warhol’s
signature style—the elements of which are absent from the Goldsmith photo.”9 Despite this clear
acknowledgement of style, the Second Circuit rejected any transferal of authorship, stating that a
transformative work must comprise “something more than the imposition of another artist’s style
7

Douglas Crimp, “Appropriating Appropriation,” in Appropriation, ed. David Evans (London: Whitechapel Gallery
Ventures Limited, 2009), 193.
8

Martha Buskirk (@marthabuskirk), Twitter post, May 26, 2021, 7:27 pm,
https://twitter.com/martha_buskirk/status/1375590297250435075.
9

AWF v. Goldsmith, 992 F.3d 99 (2nd Cir. 2021) at pg. 28.

41

on the primary work.”10 The court’s reading of the Vanity Fair image suggests that this
“imposition” is in fact a reduction, only removing features from the photograph while adding
nothing to it.11 Such a suggestion does not consider why Vanity Fair might have commissioned a
portrait from Warhol over any other artist—or even Goldsmith herself—and the effect which the
subsequent portraits might have had on Vanity Fair readers and Prince Series viewers in both
1984 and 2021.
Missing from this case, and the limited scholarship that has followed it so far, is a
consideration of how the Prince Series fits into Warhol’s larger body of portraiture. The date of
the Prince Series, 1984, invites a slight art-historical complication: by the 1970s, Warhol was
largely using his own photographs for many of his celebrity portraits. He had a particular affinity
for Polaroids, which now serve as a record of the parade of famous, powerful, and wealthy faces
who passed through his studio until his death in 1987.12 As the “court painter” of his time, in the
words of art historian Robert Rosenblum, Warhol discovered that “the best method of
electrifying the old-master portrait tradition with sufficient energy to absorb the real, living
world” required the integration of photography, “the most common-place source of visual
information about our famous contemporaries” into the creation of each painting.13 In its use of a
photograph from an outside source, the Prince Series recalls Warhol’s earlier portraiture from the

10

Ibid.

11

Note also that the court viewed the Goldsmith photograph and Purple Fame as functionally identical images,
arguing that “the overarching purpose and function of the two works at issue here is identical, not merely in the
broad sense that they are created as works of visual art, but also in the narrow but essential sense that they are
portraits of the same person.” See AWF, 992 F.3d 99 (2nd Cir. 2021) at pg. 29.
12

Warhol primarily used a Polaroid Big Shot and Polaroid SX-70 during this period. See Richard B. Woodward,
“Instant Andy Instant Art,” in Andy Warhol Polaroids 1958-1987, ed. Reuel Golden (Cologne: Taschen, 2017), 11.
13

Robert Rosenblum, “Andy Warhol: Court Painter to the 70s,” in Andy Warhol: Portraits of the Seventies and
Eighties (London: Thames and Hudson, 1993), 140-41.

42

1960s, when he lifted photographs from the media to paint the likes of Marilyn Monroe, Liz
Taylor, and Elvis Presley.
This shift in process, however, does not significantly affect the facts of the Goldsmith
case. In the broadest sense, Warhol’s subject matter is the same; these images of Prince
contribute to the same cult of celebrity as the Polaroid-based portraits. Even as the artist began to
complete private commissions, he imbued each of his subjects with an aura of fame, not only
through the screen-print technique he had adopted from the mass media, but also due to his own
fame as an artist. According to curator Henry Geldzahler, Warhol’s portraits could imbue any
subject with an air of celebrity:
The secret of Andy’s portraits is not difficult to discover. He gave ‘movie star’ treatment
to the talented, rich, and famous as well as to anyone who could afford the twenty-five
thousand dollars for a forty-inch square portrait … The point was always to accentuate
the positive, eliminate the negative, and come up with a likeness that was recognizable
but that existed in a ‘world that never was,’ a sort of lusty yet ethereal limbo where
everyone was s star, not only for fifteen minutes, but, in this incarnation caught
permanently on canvas, ‘forever.’14
The Vanity Fair article similarly highlighted Prince’s reputation as a personality who, for better
or for worse, had “captured the American imagination.”15 A Warhol portrait aptly reinforces
Prince’s celebrity status for both the magazine readers and the Prince Series viewers.
According to Geldzahler, “Andy and his subject-matter remain identical in our minds.
More than any other artwork of the sixties, Andy Warhol’s are popular and instantly
recognizable to a remarkably wide public.”16 It was not only a matter of name recognition; this
“wide public” for Warhol’s work from the 1980s to the present would have recognized the style
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of a celebrity portraitist who had already spent decades applying his style to widely recognizable
faces and brands. Viewers with greater art-historical knowledge, those who drive the market for
Warhol’s silkscreens, were likely familiar with Warhol’s past and present portraiture processes,
from the use of third-party images in the 1960s to his own Polaroids in the 1970s and 1980s. The
fact that the Prince Series more closely aligns with Warhol’s earlier portraiture practice does not
affect its status as, first and foremost, a group of Warhol portraits. While the removal of elements
from the source photograph can and should be considered a transformation in itself, it was not a
mere “imposition” of style as the Second Circuit had suggested. Warhol’s translation of
Goldsmith’s image into a series of Pop portraits adds new meaning to the source material, in this
case an instant communication of fame. Each image in the Prince Series tells its viewer that the
subject is, in some way, important. Whether the courts can accept this stylistic shift is another
matter.
One critical issue with a potential reliance on artistic style is tied to a fame bias in
copyright cases surrounding the visual arts. As she reflects upon the institutional network that
supports appropriation art in her 1992 essay “Commodification as Censor,” Buskirk notes one of
the major reasons for the scarcity of known art-world copyright disputes:
[W]hile a tremendously large number of the works produced during the last three decades
have employed strategies of appropriation, only a very few have provoked legal action.
The vast majority of works circulated within the art world … are not likely to attract this
type of notice. Based on the descriptions of the various legal actions that have been
brought, it appears that it is mainly when artists have become media figures themselves—
when they have gained sufficient stature or notoriety to have their works reproduced in
venues that cater to a broader audience—that they run into problems.17
The likelihood and practicality of a lawsuit requires a potentially infringing work to have a
certain number of viewers; those that do are often the product of powerhouse artists such as
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Warhol, Richard Prince, and Jeff Koons.18 Simultaneously the most recent and most extreme
example of the artist-as-brand, Koons has pushed his status to the point of infamy among some
and luxury among others, as Buskirk recounts in Is it Ours?:
Koons, following in Warhol’s footsteps, can readily be described as a type of brand,
offering a cachet evidently recognized by consumers of luxury goods that circulate in the
same ecosystem. In stark contrast to the vast majority of exhibiting artists, who are lucky
if they are able to support themselves with their creative practice alone, Koons has
established himself as an art-world power broker.19
Warhol’s brand has not steered so close to infamy. In his essay “In Transition: Warhol’s
Flowers,” art historian Michael Lobel declares that Warhol had firmly established his brand by
1964, at which point he could comfortably explore subject matter outside instantly recognizable
icons. Lobel writes, “Fame, which had long been one of the primary subjects of his work, was
now also one of its effects. Warhol’s status as an artistic brand had been secured.”20 The Prince
Series demonstrates that Warhol had not entirely pivoted away from celebrity subject matter, but
by 1984 it was clear that his style would elevate any subject to an icon—including an image of
Prince taken very early in his career. Celebrity begets celebrity; Warhol’s reputation invited
copyright disputes, but it also granted him access to wealth and resources that made such
disputes insignificant in the broader scope of his career.
The majority of artists still have not established the type of prominent artistic “brand”
that Warhol’s work still exudes, and the Warhol Foundation’s commitment to maintaining this
artist-as-brand status is evident in their ongoing pursuit of the recent copyright dispute with
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Goldsmith. In fact, the Warhol Foundation is the plaintiff in this case; in 2017, after Goldsmith
notified the Warhol Foundation about the alleged violation of her copyright, the Warhol
Foundation sued her and her agency in search of “a declaratory judgment that the Prince series
works were non-infringing or, in the alternative, that they made fair use of Goldsmith’s
photograph.”21 A judgment of this kind would demonstrate that the Second Circuit is willing to
incorporate outside information to make a more informed decision regarding the ability of an
artist’s style, particularly a recognizable “brand,” to transform pre-existing source material to
incorporate new meaning. Informed observers form a community of knowledgeable researchers,
collectors, buyers, and dealers that drive the market in which Warhol’s work sells. New
strategies of connoisseurship, either within the courts or through reliance on expert testimony,
can allow a determination of fair use to better replicate the real-world conditions of artistic
production and sales in the contemporary art market.
Perhaps the greatest legal difficulty in proving a legitimate transfer of authorship via
artistic style is the unrealistic expectation of connoisseurship or aesthetic judgment placed upon
the court. Legal professionals cannot reasonably be expected to hold an understanding of every
contemporary artistic genre, let alone an ability to differentiate the work of every individual
artist. The absence of a standard of connoisseurship explains the appeal of the “ordinary
observer” or “reasonable observer” test in fair use decisions. In his guide to art law, Jones
defines this test at its most basic:
The test for copyright infringement on paper is relatively straightforward: whether an
ordinary person, while examining the original work and the alleged copied work side by
side, would conclude that the second work is indeed copied from the original work. The
copy does not have to be an exact reproduction of the first work. A finding of substantial
similarity is sufficient.22
21
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The ordinary observer test is not a literal test given to a person in a courtroom but rather a
hypothetical scenario in which an average person with no specialized knowledge would look at
the works on either side of the case and determine whether they look adequately similar at face
value.23 Near the conclusion of the AWF decision, the court declared that Warhol and
Goldsmith’s artworks are substantially similar because “an average lay observer would recognize
the alleged copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted work.”24
This test may also be applied as part of the first factor of fair use—the “purpose and
character of the use”—to assess whether the secondary work is adequately “transformative.” In a
brief case note on AWF, art and copyright attorney Molly Torsen Stech suggests that the Second
Circuit’s finding of substantial similarity pushes the “pendulum” of fair use closer to equilibrium
after the loosened interpretation of “transformativeness” in 2013 with Cariou v. Prince. In an act
of bold generalization, Stech suggests that the “subjective approach” of Cariou sets a perilous
precedent that would allow the court to “categorise almost any imaginable use in the visual arts
discipline as transformative.”25 Here we see the necessity of informed observation in the
determination of both transformation and similarity; Stech may be correct in that many uses may
be transformative, but the contemporary art world often does not see this type of use as a
problem. The question of how to incorporate this type of brand recognition into a legal analysis
of images, however, is more challenging.
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The Second Circuit rejected the argument from the Warhol Foundation and amici that
supported a modified version of the “ordinary observer” which called for a “more discerning
observer.”26 Criticisms of the test have become increasingly common as the obvious visual
similarities between two artworks have often dissolved in modern to contemporary artworks that
go to court. Philosophy professor Julie C. Van Camp notes that “the jury of lay observers
functions in the same way as the community of the art world, which, through its talk and actions,
ultimately arbitrates identity.”27 Because the views of an average observer effectively replace
those of the informed observers in the art world, the application of this test frequently appears
presumptively unfair.
Some authors suggest that the incorporation of a connoisseurship standard into the
“ordinary observer” test is both a necessary and a plausible option in today’s copyright system.
Buskirk notes that the role of connoisseurship in the institutional support of artworks has shifted
significantly:
New rules [in the art world] are continually evolving in the intersection of the system of
connoisseurship developed in relation to old masters and the very different issues
inherent to more contemporary works. … These rules, whether explicit or implied, are a
reflection of the degree to which the environment surrounding the display and criticism
of art has become institutionalized. It is also this institutional network that allows works
based on appropriated popular-culture imagery to be defined as art.28
The eye of a hypothetical lay viewer may no longer be sufficient in the determination of
substantial similarity, particularly in cases such as Rogers, Cariou, and AWF. These types of fair
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use cases have attracted an unusually high number of amicus briefs, some of which feature
arguments against the “ordinary observer” test as it currently stands. In anticipation of the
Cariou decision in 2013, for example, the Rauschenberg and Warhol Foundations argued jointly
that the court must determine more specifically who the observer might be. In a section of their
amici brief, appropriately titled “The Court Needs Evidence of Who the ‘Reasonable Observer’
Is and How That Observer Would Perceive the Works at Issue,” the two foundations argued in
favor of greater input from those with artistic knowledge. They explained, “The uncertainty and
unpredictability that results from fair use decisions made without a fully-developed record as to
the possible range of reasonable observers can only lead to subjective outcomes that chill artistic
freedom of expression. The only way to avoid these problems is to inform the Court’s decision
with evidence from members of the broader art community.”29 To determine exactly how to
incorporate this evidence is a complicated and perhaps impossible task.
In her essay “Connoisseurship and its Potential in Matters of Copyright,” art historian
Joan Kee presents the idea that copyright law might encourage more detailed looking than the
“ordinary observer” test currently requires of judges and jury members. In a determination of
substantial similarity, Kee suggests that these observers might approach the disputed works in
terms of their function and identity “as a material and physical entity designed to be encountered
at the level of the phenomenological: as an image to be seen as well as a thing to be
experienced.”30 In practice, however, this kind of looking adds a complex requirement to an
otherwise simple test; in AWF specifically, attention to detail is not required for the recognition
of a popular artist’s style. Though Kee argues that her article “does not call for judges and jury
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members to actually become connoisseurs,” it is difficult to determine a broadly applicable
doctrine that might allow for complex function-based investigation of artworks without some
degree of specialized knowledge.31 Kee acknowledges that connoisseurship “is a skill learned
only through example, not precept. Yet it does not likewise follow that the judge in summary
judgement or the jury in trial need be an uninformed observer.”32
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the limited number of precedent-setting fair use
cases in the visual arts requires us to look to cases in music for applicable standards. Kee cites
the 1994 Fourth Circuit case Dawson v. Hinshaw Music as evidence that the general identity of
the hypothetical ordinary observer might be modified in some cases.33 Dawson established that
the ordinary observer is a member of the work’s intended audience. In most cases, this person is
still the average lay person with no specialized knowledge. However, the dispute in Dawson
featured two choral arrangements of the same spiritual that likely sounded substantially similar
to an uninformed audience but would be clearly distinguishable to the choral directors that select
and purchase the arrangements. The Fourth Circuit relied on one of the fundamental intentions of
copyright law to support their interpretation of the ordinary observer test. Because the copyright
system provides economic protections to creators, the court noted that sometimes “the intended
audience is more narrow in that it possesses specialized expertise, relevant to the purchasing
decision.”34 Within this specific set of facts, the intended audience could therefore be the
hypothetical community that determines the financial success of the work, rather than an
“ordinary” person with no industry-specific knowledge.
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Kee references Dawson in order to argue that its findings should be applied to visual arts
cases, but this approach would inevitably prove difficult in practice. Dawson’s specific
wording—“intended audience” rather than “intended buyer”—invites hesitation. In the case of
the Warhol Foundation, for instance, buyers certainly do not compose the entirety of Warhol’s
audience. The application of a connoisseurship standard, at least within a determination of
substantial visual similarity, quickly becomes messy, requiring credible expert testimony, a
specific investigation of each artist’s audience, and final aesthetic judgments on the part of the
court. The appeal of the “ordinary observer” test is its ability to leave the conclusion to the court
without any extraneous variables. Stech praises the Second Circuit’s decision because it “rightly
elevates the subjectivity of today’s culture in general instead of the subjectivity of the panel of
judges deciding the case. In other words, the court is not acting as a critic or an art historian.”35
With the court’s realistic capabilities in mind, the incorporation of an “intended audience”
approach is impractical due to its reliance on outside testimony and the difficulty of quantifying
connoisseurship in a concrete, factual manner for legal presentation. Kee’s suggestions in favor
of applied connoisseurship in the “ordinary observer” test therefore fall short. This test is not the
appropriate venue for the court’s consultation of an artist’s community of buyers, particularly in
the types of visual arts copyright infringement cases that actually make it as far as the courts. The
only plausible modification to the test would be to abandon it altogether.
While a determination of fair use largely relies on an artwork’s effect on the general
public, the final, market-focused factor realistically only reflects a small segment of the public,
though Warhol’s segment is larger than most. Kee’s reference to a more specific intended
audience is better applied here. The behaviors and values of an artist’s collectors, buyers, and
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dealers—a concentrated segment of that artist’s intended audience—can still be examined to
differentiate quite effectively between artworks, even those that a court has found substantially
similar using the “ordinary observer” test. The fourth factor of fair use, which investigates the
allegedly infringing artwork’s impact on the copyrighted work’s value and sales potential, is
often considered the most important of the four factors and yet does not reflect the real
conditions surrounding sales and values in the contemporary art market.36 In actuality, the
likelihood of market harm is quite low in an analysis of two separate artworks.37
The details of the fourth factor reveal its complications, as it prompts the court to
determine whether or not the defendant’s work negatively affects the copyright holder’s current
and potential market value if the use becomes “widespread.”38 The consideration of the potential
market, including any derivative works, grants an excess of market power to the original
copyright holder. To some degree, the AWF decision demonstrated a surprisingly progressive
approach to a market analysis as the Second Circuit begins to acknowledge that two artists will
mostly operate in different markets. In their analysis of the fourth factor of fair use, the court
noted, “We agree with the district court that the primary market for the Warhol Prince Series
(that is, the market for the original works) and the Goldsmith Photograph do not meaningfully
overlap, and Goldsmith does not seriously challenge that determination on appeal.”39 This case is
a rarity; few decisions have so readily accepted this lack of overlap. Even within the Second
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Circuit, the court often approaches the fourth factor as if there is only one market for all art, in
which any potential sales situation becomes possible. In Rogers, for instance, the court failed to
consider whether a photographic notecard and a sculpture for a major gallery exhibition would
realistically compete in a remotely similar market, as each is an entirely inadequate replacement
for the other.
Despite their admission that Prince and Goldsmith do not compete within the same
primary market, the Second Circuit still wrote decidedly in favor of Goldsmith:
We cannot, however, endorse the court’s implicit rationale that the market for Warhol’s
works is the market for “Warhols,” as doing so would permit this aspect of the fourth
factor always to weigh in favor of the alleged infringer so long as he is sufficiently
successful to have generated an active market for his own work. … We are unpersuaded,
however, by the district court’s conclusion that the Prince Series poses no threat to
Goldsmith’s licensing markets.40
Similar to their earlier acknowledgement and immediate rejection of Warhol’s artistic, style, the
Second Circuit’s analysis of the market in this passage is actually quite realistic, despite such a
strong refusal to accept it. The “market for ‘Warhols’” is a reality, one so strong that the public
interest in his artworks extends beyond the art market into the realms of licensing, publishing,
advertising, popular culture, product design, and more. To understand how this seemingly
omnipresent network of Warhol images has come to exist, and how it manages not to overlap
with any current or derivative markets for Goldsmith’s photograph, we must first understand the
social behaviors that drive value. By definition, in addition to the potential market for the
copyrighted work, a determination of fair use should also consider the value of both works. Very
few fair use decisions measure real or hypothetical market impact in these quantitative terms,
and yet it is the social construction of value that reveals the fallacy of market harm.
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The strict professional standards of fine art appraisers can help us understand how value
is determined. To give an opinion of the fair market value (FMV) of an art object, members of
organizations such as the American Society of Appraisers (ASA) use slight variations upon the
general FMV definition in the Code of Federal Regulations: “The price at which the property
would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any
compulsion to buy or sell, and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts.”41 The value
of an artwork is, therefore, determined by the community of knowledgeable buyers and sellers
who are familiar with that specific type of work. Increases or decreases in value are shaped by
the community’s interest in certain “characteristics of value” such as the artist, style, material,
condition, or even more specific characteristics such as color, provenance, or subject matter. The
social construction of value is critical to our understanding of the art market. The ASA notes that
“the ‘players’ in the market arena where properties are regularly traded provide not just price
data, but also information on the characteristics of value that attract collectors to specific
properties, general market information, and condition reports.”42 Especially at Warhol’s level,
sales are driven by a community of buyers who look for certain characteristics of value in order
to determine what they are willing to pay.
Communities of knowledgeable buyers are most visible in the world of fine art auctions.
In his seminal 1938 book Auctions: The Social Construction of Value, Queens College and
CUNY Graduate Center sociology professor Charles W. Smith reported his observations from
years of diverse auctions in order to analyze the inherently social processes of these markets and
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discover what dynamics might differentiate the various types of auctions in our society, such as
the separation of fine art sales from those of cars, fish, or real estate. According to Smith, the
markets for art, antiques, and collectibles often include a “subset of core members made up of
primarily dealers and collectors who know each other and each other’s tastes,” whose sense of
community comes from “their shared view of the worth and value of the goods they pursue.”43
While other bidders certainly also participate in these sales, they do not have any real
effect on the shaping of value in the long term. Smith observes that “their relevancy to the whole
auction process remains minor because their low bids do not hinder or interfere with the
communal process of determining value and allocating goods;” even if the bidder does
successfully bid high enough to surpass the socially perceived value, “these purchases are
commonly minimized and excluded from the definitional process” because the core community
of buyers recognizes and disregards outliers from the norm.44 Auctions serve as a reliable
indicator of value in the art market as the most public venue for a community of knowledgeable
buyers to reach a consensus on what certain characteristics are worth to them at a given moment
in time.45 The dynamics of the auction market also demonstrate that this community values this
collective legitimization over their own individual economic interests.46 According to Smith,
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“The price is legitimized by the community of active participants as much as punishment is
legitimized by a jury.”47
Smith wrote in the 1930s, but these communal dynamics are still just as applicable, if not
more so, in the contemporary art market. The values of the community, however, have changed.
In her 2018 article “Why Art Does Not Need Copyright,” Amy Adler investigates the fourth
factor of fair use, suggesting that the art market self-regulates so successfully that copyright
regulations become entirely unnecessary in the visual arts. Aiming to “juxtapos[e] the theory of
copyright with the reality of the contemporary art market,” Adler highlights “the fundamental
mismatch between the two.”48 This gap between theory and reality is quite clear. To begin her
argument, Adler clarifies that visual art is entirely different from other media, such as literature
or music, in the sense that “the basic premise of copyright law—that the unauthorized copy poses
a threat to creativity—does not apply to visual art” due to a powerful yet largely ignored
mechanism of the art market: the “norm of authenticity.”49 Adler’s article furthers the idea that,
outside forgery, one artist’s copy quite literally cannot disrupt another artist’s primary and
derivative markets.50
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Recall that the AWF decision rejected the suggestion that the market for Warhol’s works
is largely driven by a desire for “Warhols.” An understanding of the norm of authenticity during
a fourth factor analysis, however, reveals that Warhol’s artist-as-brand status actually does create
a demand for his work regardless of its content. Adler clarifies that the norm of authenticity
means that the current market’s determination of value rests almost entirely upon verifiable
authorship. She explains, “Art’s market value, increasingly divorced from aesthetics, resides to a
large extent in the identity and reputation of the artist to whom it is attributed. This emphasis on
authorship explains the consummate value placed on authenticity by the art market; an authentic
work is one that is properly attributed to its author.”51 Particularly in the case of AWF, authorship
is a characteristic of value which creates an expansive market divide between the Goldsmith
photograph and the Prince Series. Buskirk makes a similar argument in “Commodification as
Censor,” attributing the self-policing art market to authorship-based determinations of value:
Why is it that an artist would expect to be exempt from the copyright limitations that
govern other types of image reproduction? Perhaps a partial answer can be found in the
structure of the art world itself. Lawyers and others from the world of business often
marvel at the degree to which the art world still functions on the bases of unwritten
understandings and agreements. … One of these conventions concerns the way in which
the name of the artist attaches to the work of art, and to a particular style, at the time that
the work enters into the art world’s institutional network. Within that system, the value of
the individual work of art is dependent on the name of the artist associated with it …
once the artist’s name becomes a label given to an oeuvre it can acquire an increasingly
abstract value unto itself.52
Authentic authorship is currently the strongest pillar of the social construction of value, with the
highest values assigned to those artists with the most powerful “brands.”53 Even among those
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artists whose authorship has not been transformed into branding, another artist’s use of their
image cannot strip it of its value. It is easy to frame the Prince Series and the Goldsmith
photograph as if they are identical; they are portraits of the same subject, first published in
American magazines within only a few years of each other. The norm of authenticity, however,
quickly differentiates the Warhol and Goldsmith images by authorship alone, allowing them to
exist—and sell—independently of each other. The value of the Prince Series rests not in
Warhol’s particular aesthetic choices, but rather in the abstract value of his artistic brand.
The Second Circuit also found that the Prince Series threatens Goldsmith’s licensing
markets. Because the fourth factor of fair use grants an excessive degree of protection to
copyrighted works, the court stated that, despite no intention on Goldsmith’s part to continue
licensing her photograph, Warhol’s use of her image might damage any hypothetical future
licensing opportunities.54 Goldsmith argued that “both [works] are illustrations of the same
famous musician with the same overlapping customer base,” and the court inexplicably agreed
that the images are essentially interchangeable.55 Fortunately for the Warhol Foundation, Adler’s
article also addresses the reality of licensing income in the art market. She makes a deceptively
simple argument: “Copies almost never provide a source of income for visual artists.”56 Though
Goldsmith’s practice as a media photographer lends itself to more frequent licensing
opportunities, as does the popularity of Warhol’s work in mass culture, the Second Circuit’s
suggestion that the Prince Series threatens Goldsmith’s licensing options creates a false
equivalence between original artworks and licensed copies in terms of profitability.
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Adler suggests that most artists make a significantly larger portion of their income from
first sale, as “visual artists, unlike other producers of intellectual property, almost never have a
market for derivative uses of their works.”57 The primary market for Warhol’s work remains in
traditional sales in venues such as galleries and auctions.58 While the Warhol Foundation likely
makes a significant income from licensing, it is again unlikely that they will make such rampant
use of the Prince Series that it would significantly affect either party’s overall market or value.
Warhol is a particularly useful example for an examination of licensing markets in fair
use cases because his imagery is so widespread, so conspicuously present in books, magazines,
advertisements, clothing, prints, toys, articles, and anywhere else someone might be able to
reproduce an image.59 Warhol’s artworks and style have maintained a strong presence in
American mass media and material culture for decades, in part because he had engaged so
closely with these same sources to create his work. This combination of Warhol’s iconic style
with familiar faces and brands has led to an astronomically higher number of licensing
opportunities than many artists will likely ever achieve. In fact, Adler cites Warhol as an
example of an artist with an unusually active licensing market that extends far beyond the art
market and leads to significant posthumous income for the Warhol Foundation:
Warhol’s images are frequently licensed not only for art posters but also for a dizzying
range of products such as sneakers, snowboards, and even condoms. Yet even for
Warhol, the most reproduced, most iconic contemporary artist, the value of this market
for derivative works is trivial compared to the value of the unique art objects. The Warhol
Foundation, which licenses Warhol’s works, made approximately $4 million in 2014
from all of its many licensing activities. Contrast that figure with the value of a single
57
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Warhol canvas: a Warhol painting sold for $105 million in 2013; another sold for $81.9
million in 2014.60
Even the colossal Warhol licensing empire does not compare to the extraordinary value of his
original works, and so we return once more to the norm of authenticity, which characterizes an
artist’s brand as an assertion of authorship. Adler is correct that market success in the visual arts
does not rely upon copyright protections to the degree that other types of media do. Current
interpretations of the fourth factor of fair use simply do not reflect the values of the communities
that drive value in the art market. Knowledgeable buyers can tell the difference between
Goldsmith’s photograph and Warhol’s silkscreen; they assign value accordingly. Neither image
is a suitable replacement for the other in the eyes of an informed community. If the Second
Circuit’s concern is correct and this socially-focused rationale will inevitably weigh
overwhelmingly in favor of the alleged infringer, so be it; this simply means that the law will
more closely reflect the reality of the art world and its markets.
In December 2021, the Warhol Foundation filed a petition to begin the process of
challenging the Second Circuit verdict.61 On March 28, 2022, the Supreme Court of the United
States granted the Warhol Foundation’s request.62 By the summer of 2022, this case will join the
incredibly small list of disputes in the visual arts to reach the highest level of the United States
court system. In their petition, the Warhol Foundation asserted that the Second Circuit’s decision
could cause harm to free expression:
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The Second Circuit’s rule chills artistic speech by imposing the threat of ruinous
penalties on artists who must predict—ex ante— whether their new work will be deemed
too “recognizable” to merit fair use protection. By the same token, it may now be
unlawful for collectors to sell—and museums to display—a large swath of works of art
that must derive inspiration from other works without fear of draconian consequences.63
In addition, by February 2022, several major figures and institutions had filed amicus briefs to
offer greater insight into the facts and future implications of this case. Among the most notable
“friends of the court” are Barbara Kruger, curator and critic Robert Storr, the Robert
Rauschenberg Foundation, the Roy Lichtenstein Foundation, and the Brooklyn Museum.
Copyright and art law professors alike, including Adler, have submitted similar briefs in favor of
the Warhol Foundation.64
This onslaught of support for the Warhol Foundation from a wide array of voices in the
art world reflects the necessity of specialized knowledge in visual art copyright cases,
particularly in a finding of fair use. The copyright system exists with the public in mind,
measuring a potential infringement’s effect on public perception. This public-first approach fails,
however, not in the “ordinary observer” test but in the fourth factor of fair use, which largely
ignores that the art market uses a communal standard of connoisseurship and valuation to prevent
market harm through copying. By combining Adler’s norm of authenticity and Smith’s
observations on socially driven market dynamics, the determination of value in the art market
can be a vehicle for greater artistic connoisseurship in fair use analyses. In the case of Warhol, an
artist whose fame, quantity of work, recognizable style, and posthumous licensing empire have
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allowed an unusually large segment of the public to buy a “Warhol” of some kind, we can
observe how the cultivation of an artistic brand can create value for contemporary art buyers.
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Chapter Three: Art and Activism in David Wojnarowicz v. American Family Association
The previous two chapters of this thesis investigate lawsuits against well-known artists.
In David Wojnarowicz’s case, however, the artist initiated a lawsuit of his own, leveraging his
legal rights in order to assert his political and creative rights. This chapter discusses the 1990
case David Wojnarowicz v. American Family Association and Donald E. Wildmon (which I
shorten to Wojnarowicz from this point forward) to illuminate its connections to activist efforts
of the late twentieth century and artists of the same period exploring methods of control over
their images. Several decades of political debates, the activities of artists’ collectives, political
demonstrations, and new legislative efforts provide context for Wojnarowicz’s lawsuit, in which
the artist combines copyright and moral rights claims to protect his images and his community
from harm.
In January of 1990, the University Galleries at Illinois State University opened the
exhibition David Wojnarowicz: Tongues of Flame, the artist’s only retrospective during his
lifetime. Each artwork in the mixed media exhibition reflected Wojnarowicz’s engagement with
various social and political issues in the 1980s and his experience with the emerging AIDS
epidemic; the assembled works explored a broad range of subjects, from the devastation of the
artist’s personal losses to his seething rage against a government that has failed its people in a
health crisis. Many of the artworks in the exhibition explicitly targeted the American government
for its irresponsible inaction as the AIDS epidemic was beginning to spread. To help fund the
exhibition and the publication of its catalogue, the museum’s then-director Barry Blinderman
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accepted a $15,000 grant from the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA), a federal agency
that has provided monetary support to creative projects since 1965.1
Blinderman’s acceptance of federal funding for an exhibition that included sexually
explicit images, albeit in only a small percentage of the artworks, sparked the fury of
fundamentalist minister Donald E. Wildmon, founder of the American Family Association
(AFA).2 Founded in 1977 and headquartered in Tupelo, Mississippi, the AFA aims to “promot[e]
decency in the American society and advanc[e] the Judeo-Christian ethic in America”; beginning
in the late 1980s, this mission began to include campaigns against NEA funded-exhibitions of
“offensive” and “blasphemous” art.3 In April 1990, Wildmon and the AFA photocopied and
cropped fourteen offending fragments of images from the Tongues of Flame catalogue to create
an inflammatory pamphlet with a header that proclaims “Your Tax Dollars Helped Pay For
These ‘Works of Art’” (Figure 9). The AFA enclosed these two-page pamphlets in envelopes
marked “Caution—Contains Extremely Offensive Material” and mailed them to a variety of
recipients including 523 members of Congress, 3,230 Christian leaders, 947 Christian radio
stations, and 1,578 newspapers.4

1

It is necessary to reiterate here that the NEA grant funded exhibition development for Tongues of Flame;
Blinderman did not use the money to pay Wojnarowicz to create these works, as the AFA’s pamphlet suggests. See
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Each of the photographs in the AFA pamphlet is intentionally decontextualized in order
to convey a misleading message to its readers. Sexually explicit imagery makes up the majority
of the pamphlet—eleven5 of the fourteen images—but the AFA does not explain that most of
these are closely cropped, miniscule selections from collages in the 1989 Sex Series. Similarly,
the AFA paid no attention to the contextual meaning of these images or the rhetorical depth with
which Wojnarowicz consistently explained the content of his work. In his trial testimony,
Wojnarowicz contextualized the image Wildmon had extracted from Untitled, a collage from the
Sex Series (Figure 10). He told the court, “In the upper right-hand corner there is a small inset of
two men engaged in sexual activity, and below that in the lower right-hand corner is a negative
of a partial newspaper story detailing how a group of men on the Upper West Side chased and
beat and stabbed two teenagers who they perceived to be homosexual.”6 The AFA pamphlet also
incorporated the upper right-hand corner of the 1979 collage Untitled (Genet After Brassaï): an
image of Jesus—halo, crown of thorns, and all—with a hypodermic needle in his arm (Figure
11). In Wildmon’s eyes, of course, such an image was an aggressive affront to Christianity.
Wojnarowicz testified to the contrary:
I thought about my upbringing. I thought about what I had been taught about Jesus Christ
when I was young, and how he took on the suffering of all people in the world, and I
wanted to create a modern image that, if he were alive before me at that time in ‘79 when
I made this, if he were alive physically before me in the streets of the Lower East Side, I
wanted to make a symbol that would show that he would take on the suffering of the vast
amounts of addiction that I saw in the streets.7

5

The fourteen images include eleven depictions of sexual acts, one image of Christ with a hypodermic needle in his
arm, and what the court describes as “two ambiguous scenes which plaintiff represents as respectively depicting an
African purification ritual and two men dancing together.” The S.D.N.Y. decision did not clarify Wildmon’s
interpretation of the ambiguous images. See Wojnarowicz, 745 F.Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) at 134.
6
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Wojnarowicz attempted to align Christian ideas of care and suffering with some of the issues
affecting contemporary society. According to his testimony, he meant this image not as an act of
blasphemy, but as a reflection of the struggles that affected real people: quite the opposite of
Wildmon’s assumption. To the pamphlet’s readers, however, the artist’s “offensive’ images
stand alone, stripped of meaning, in a taxpayer-funded pornographic exhibition of degeneracy.8
Wojnarowicz took Wildmon and the AFA to court rather quickly. Alongside his attorney,
David Cole, the artist sued both parties for copyright infringement, defamation, and violations of
the Lanham Act and the New York Artists’ Authorship Rights Act (NYAARA).9 The trial began
on June 25, 1990 in the Southern District court of New York (S.D.N.Y.). On August 8, the
district court dismissed three of Wojnarowicz’s claims and found that the AFA had only violated
his rights under NYAARA, a moral victory to be dissected later in this chapter. In addition, the
decision required the AFA to produce and distribute a corrective pamphlet to each of the original
recipients as an act of “disattribution.”10 Because he allegedly could not provide any evidence of
direct harm to his reputation, sales, or exhibition prospects, the court awarded Wojnarowicz
nominal damages of one dollar. In her 2012 biography Fire in the Belly: The Life and Times of
David Wojnarowicz, former Village Voice writer Cynthia Carr recalled the artist’s celebration:
“He called me and many others that day to say that he’d won this dollar and that, depending on
how he felt, he would use it to buy either a condom or an ice cream cone. He got a little chuckle

8

Wildmon even described the individual images in the pamphlets as “works of art,” implying that each picture
forms an entire artwork rather than a fragment of one. Even when provided with numerous statements to the
contrary, Wildmon continued to refer to each image as an independent work of art. See Inde, Art in the Courtroom,
122.
9
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out of that. In fact, he specified that the AFA write him a check, no doubt intending to use it in
some future piece.”11 Wildmon signed the check on October 16, 1990 (Figure 12). Wojnarowicz
never cashed it.12
Many brief articles, mostly in the Village Voice and The New York Times, covered this
dispute as it unfolded. A Village Voice article from May 1990 by Elizabeth Hess, titled “Artist
Doesn’t Turn Other Cheek,” includes a rare reproduction of a portion of the infamous AFA
pamphlet. Hess writes in clear support of Wojnarowicz, reporting that “the reverend (or his
minions) went cruising through the catalogue’s reproductions, plucking out what he considered
to be the most ‘obscene’ pictures. (‘He missed a few good ones,’ says the artist).”13 With a more
serious tone, a July 1990 article by Tom Wicker in The New York Times focused on the
potentially chilling effect of Wildmon’s homophobic crusade on the long-term viability of the
NEA. Wicker writes the Wojnarowicz case off as “only a minor setback” in Wildmon’s attempts
to persuade Congress to restrict or end the NEA.14 After its resolution, however, the case faded
quite quickly into obscurity, receiving no scholarly attention beyond brief mentions in
biographies and catalogues as a mere point along the timeline of Wojnarowicz’s life. The manner
in which this case echoes decades of art, activism, and copyright complications is mentioned
extremely rarely in these texts.
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Additionally, in the years after the conclusion of the case, it has become quite common
for authors to write about it as if Wojnarowicz had claimed a more significant victory. A 1999
article in Out by writer and filmmaker Peter von Ziegesar describes Wojnarowicz as “the ragefilled AIDS radical who in 1990 challenged Donald Wildmon and his American Family
Association in Court for misrepresenting his work as pornography, and won.”15 Some materials
report the result with even more explicit inaccuracy. Online text from the Whitney Museum’s
2018 Wojnarowicz retrospective History Keeps Me Awake at Night, for instance, states plainly
that the artist “sued the [AFA] for copyright infringement and won.”16 Inaccurate claims like this
one form a network of misleading reporting. Writer and filmmaker Alexis Clements, while
reviewing the exhibition for Hyperallergic, marveled at the Whitney exhibition’s inclusion of
“drafts of the affidavit for [Wojnarowicz’s] successful lawsuit against the American Family
Association.”17 Though it is true that Wojnarowicz found success, albeit mild, in his assertion of
artists’ rights, his other three claims had been dismissed. Most existing coverage of this case,
both during and after, does not investigate its role in the longer history of political and artistic
activism in the late twentieth century.
The Tongues of Flame exhibition opened only nine years after the identification of HIV
and AIDS in the United States. President Ronald Reagan did not mention AIDS publicly until
1985; the Whitney Museum notes online that 3,766 people had died of AIDS-related causes in
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New York by the end of that year alone.18 Writer and activist Susan Sontag’s 1989 book AIDS
and its Metaphors investigates the metaphors that shape our perceptions of illness and the body.
As a former cancer patient reflecting upon the lessening stigmatization of her own disease,
Sontag observes, “It seems that societies need to have one illness which becomes identified with
evil, and attaches blame to its ‘victims.’” AIDS, she writes, was “a terrifying new disease …
[that] has provided a large-scale occasion for the metaphorizing of illness.”19 American
politicians of the late twentieth century quickly attached these metaphors of evil and victimhood
to the already-marginalized populations of gay men and drug users. In the Georgetown
University Gnovis Journal, Hannah Calkins cites Sontag’s book to characterize the political
climate in which Wojnarowicz and his contemporaries worked.
Understanding and expressiveness—metaphors—are the domain of artists. And artists’
communities, often populated by the “deviants” that ideologues fear and despise, were
ravaged by AIDS in the first decade and a half of the epidemic. Held hostage by a
criminally unresponsive government, artists were thus positioned to resist the oppressive
discursive metaphors that Sontag identified by making art that exposed, witnessed, and
protested the crisis.20
This type of metaphorical misrepresentation quickly bleeds into literal misrepresentation. This
phenomenon is evident in the AFA pamphlet, which characterized Wojnarowicz’s intense visual
political statements not only as pornography, but as an insulting and offensive use of taxpayer
dollars.
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Wildmon argued that the NEA wasted taxpayer dollars by supporting exhibitions of work
he did not consider to be “art.” The 1990 pamphlet was not his first protest against NEA grants
for exhibitions that contained homoerotic or “blasphemous” imagery. By the late 1980s, a
significant portion of the AFA’s focus was dedicated to campaigning against arts funding. In a
press release from July 25, 1989, the organization shared its concerns about photographs by
Robert Mapplethorpe and Andres Serrano in NEA-supported exhibitions. Using similar language
to the Wojnarowicz pamphlet, the AFA lamented that “the response by the National Endowment
for the Arts to the public outcry against these ‘works of art’ has been that ‘artists’ such as
Mapplethorpe and Serrano are an elite group of people, superior in talent to the working masses,
who deserve to be supported by the NEA with $171 million tax dollars imposed upon the
working people of America.”21 Despite the numerous hours he had clearly spent poring through
exhibition catalogues, Wildmon admitted to no real understanding of art. His attorney, Benjamin
W. Bull, asked him a series of simple questions during the Wojnarowicz trial:
Q: Rev. Wildmon, do you know anything about art?
A: Very little.
Q: Would you know the difference between a collage and a portrait?
A. No.
Q. What was the purpose of the pamphlet?
A. Specifically, to let a few key people in positions of leadership and influence know the
kind of material that our tax dollars are paying for.22
Wojnarowicz and Wildmon, the radically opposite personalities on either side of this case, each
made very loud and very public statements about how the government is misusing its money. At
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the opening of Tongues of Flame, Wojnarowicz gave a performance before a crowd of 800
attendees; Hess reported for the Village Voice that he “makes it painfully clear that people with
AIDS are alive and kicking. Kicking the government, the church, and anyone who propagates the
lie that gay people are getting what they deserve.” At one moment in his performance, he asked,
“Do you think if there were a disease that struck only politicians and religious leaders that the
president would hesitate to shift the entire $350 billion defense budget towards research and
health care?”23
Carr witnessed the close political correlation of anti-NEA sentiments and opposition to
AIDS funding in the late twentieth century, later citing the actions of North Carolina senator
Jesse Helms and California congressman William Dannemeyer as the strongest examples in her
book:
[Helms and Dannemeyer] were both virulently, self-righteously homophobic. Both
fought bitterly against spending a single government dollar on AIDS research, AIDS
prevention, or AIDS treatment. Helms masterminded the law that banned people with
HIV from entering the country. Dannemeyer backed a California ballot initiative to
quarantine people with AIDS—it failed—and he once declared that PWAs [People With
Aids] emitted spores “known to cause birth defects.” … In 1987, the Senate had adopted
a Helms amendment … that prohibited the use of federal funds for any AIDS education
materials that could “promote or encourage, directly or indirectly, homosexual
activities.”24
Their explicit homophobia and subsequent refusal to help PWAs led both men to target the NEA,
hoping to prevent further financial support for controversial work by artists like Mapplethorpe,
Serrano, and later Wojnarowicz. The NEA was a particularly strong point of frustration for these
politicians because, despite being a federal agency, its decision-making process fell squarely
outside Congress’s control. Because Dannemeyer and Helms could not directly determine which
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projects could receive the government’s support, they sought the next best option: restriction or
abolition of the NEA. Carr describes the politicians’ crusade:
Dannemeyer supported all efforts to defund the NEA, after failing in his bid to rewrite its
authorizing legislation so that Congress would have ‘oversight’ of choices made by
grantees. … Helms, however, spearheaded the anti-NEA charge in the Senate. That
September [of 1989], he cooked up an amendment aimed at preventing the likes of
Andres Serrano and Robert Mapplethorpe from ever getting another grant.25
Neither politician succeeded in abolishing the NEA, but a diluted form of the Helms Amendment
passed into law in 1990, only fueling Wildmon’s attempts to disprove the artistic merit of
Wojnarowicz’s work and prevent further grants for exhibitions like Tongues of Flame. The final
version of the Helms Amendment, which Wildmon quoted in his pamphlet, prohibits NEA
funding for “obscene” materials which include “depictions of sadomasochism, homo-eroticism,
the sexual exploitation of children, or individuals engaged in sex acts and which, when taken as a
whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.”26 Unsurprisingly,
Wojnarowicz was an intense critic of Helms, and once described him as “the repulsive senator
from zombieland who has been trying to dismantle the NEA” in a 1989 exhibition catalogue.27
This distaste is especially evident in the 1990 photograph Subspecies Helms Senatorius, which
features a small cutout image of Helms’s grinning face superimposed upon the head of a spider
with a bright red swastika on its back (Figure 13).
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The argument that Wildmon’s pamphlet presented to its audience partially hinged upon a
hazy moment of transition between the passage and enforcement of the Helms Amendment. Art
lawyer Vilis R. Inde explained this ambiguity in his extensive summary of the case:
Prior to the opening of the exhibit in Illinois, Congress had passed a law that restricted
the types of projects that the NEA could fund. Specifically, NEA funds could not be
distributed to an applicant who would produce obscene materials, without artistic or
social merit. The funding for the exhibit of Wojnarowicz’s work had been awarded
before the new limitations were established by Congress. The exhibit, however, took
place after the new law became effective.28
Though the exhibition had already closed at the University of Illinois by the time of the
pamphlet’s publication, it would continue to travel to other venues around the country.29
Wildmon therefore urgently needed to misrepresent the content of the exhibition in order to
convince both voters and lawmakers that, despite the artist’s repeated explanations of the weight
of each of his images, Wojnarowicz’s work held no “artistic or social merit.” This debate of
merit parallels the broader question which Wojnarowicz spent his career asking of political and
religious leaders alike: shouldn’t he deserve to live? “If I die,” he states in his 1991 memoir
Close to the Knives, “it is because a handful of people in power, in organized religions and
political institutions, believe that I am expendable.”30
In a video from approximately 1990, Wojnarowicz sits in a small, cluttered kitchen,
talking to someone behind the camera about federal arts funding. As the video starts,
Wojnarowicz immediately begins speaking matter-of-factly about the state of the NEA:
What the NEA is trying to do and what Congress has tried to do in passing the Helms
Amendment is control information. And the thing that makes me laugh is in the last 20
28
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years images and words that artists or writers make have absolutely no power given that
we’re essentially competing against media. … The fact that if, at this point in time,
images and words that can be made by an individual have such power to create this storm
of controversy, isn’t that great? It means that the control of information has a crack in its
wall.31
Wojnarowicz’s dispute with the AFA exemplifies the issues at the root of the political culture
wars that radiated outward from controversial NEA-sponsored exhibitions. NEA funding was an
indirect form of federal AIDS support at a time when many politicians were otherwise unwilling
to provide aid, allowing marginalized artists such as Wojnarowicz to publicly represent political
criticisms related to health and sexuality. For PWAs, this type of federal support was obviously
not a suitable replacement for AIDS education, prevention, or medical research, but a loss of
NEA funding for exhibitions like Tongues of Flame would have sent these narratives back into
the shadows, re-sealing the “crack in the wall” that the controversial artworks had created in the
mainstream flow of information.
Wojnarowicz’s legal claims against Wildmon and the AFA closely align with collective
artistic, institutional, and political goals formed over decades of artist-led activism in the late
twentieth century. The 1990 lawsuit aimed to protect not only Wojnarowicz and his reputation,
but also the provocative, anti-establishment values which his works promoted; by identifying
copyright and moral rights infringement upon the artworks in Tongues of Flame, Wojnarowicz
attempted to prevent the AFA’s use of his works to inflict political and artistic harm upon his
own community. Suing the AFA allowed Wojnarowicz to contribute to several different
branches of activist efforts including arts funding, healthcare advocacy, and moral rights.
Wojnarowicz’s life and work were, and remain, deeply intertwined with AIDS-related
advocacy. By selecting and isolating only the most “offensive” imagery from the Tongues of
31
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Flame catalogue, Wildmon eliminated the artist’s references to activism in collages like Untitled
from the Sex Series.32 In his trial testimony, Wojnarowicz described the image in the upper lefthand corner as “a photograph I made of policemen charging a group of demonstrators who were
practicing nonviolent civil disobedience outside the Food and Drug Administration protesting the
bureaucratic slowness of the release of drugs for people who have AIDS, given that in eight
years they released two drugs.”33 Inde describes the artist’s work as “a chronicle of an era,”
which provides “a visual representation of the frustration and anger of the gay community, which
resulted in numerous protests organized by ACT UP and other organizations in an effort to
expedite research, reduce the cost of medication for persons with the HIV virus, and promote gay
and lesbian rights. Although other artists have also addressed these themes, Wojnarowicz’s work
exemplified the street-level raw energy and the political milieu of the era.”34
The AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT UP), of which Wojnarowicz was a member,
formed in New York in 1987 as an angry response to social and political inaction as the AIDS
epidemic unfolded.35 The coalition’s goal to provide direct support to those affected by HIV and
AIDS persists today; ACT UP’s website notes that its mission expanded quickly to address
government negligence and institutional complacency in medicine as well as “corporate greed,
lack of solidarity and various forms of stigma and discrimination at home and abroad.”36 On July
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27, 2018, the coalition demonstrated its commitment to maintaining Wojnarowicz’s activist
legacy by demonstrating at the Whitney Museum during the History Keeps Me Awake at Night
retrospective. Characterizing the show as “an otherwise excellent exhibit,” ACT UP described
the manner in which the Whitney’s oversight negatively impacted both activism and education,
noting that many patrons were “upset when they discover[ed] they’re only getting half the
story.”37 By standing next to each artwork holding recent news articles about HIV and AIDS,
members of ACT UP drew attention to the museum’s historicization of the ongoing epidemic
(Figure 14).38
In the decades leading up to the NEA controversies and the formation of ACT UP,
various artists’ collectives had formed in the hopes of enacting large-scale reform in American
politics and the art world alike. Beginning in the late 1960s and early 1970s, each of these
collectives contributed to a climate that supported mutual aid, institutional change, and the
reallocation of public and private funds. For the exhibition tour of History Keeps Me Awake at
Night in 2019, the Museo Reína Sofia in Madrid mentioned the legacy of these collectives in
Wojnarowicz’s work, but did not address it again in any currently available materials. The
museum’s website simply notes, “Coming to prominence in the socially and culturally vibrant
East Village scene in New York in the 1980s, Wojnarowicz’s work is also testament to the end
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of the art collectives forged in the preceding decades and defined by their members’ financial
precariousness and their anti-establishment, collaborative and experimental spirit.”39
Artists were often early participants in social and political activism surrounding events
such as the American civil rights movement, the Vietnam War, and various foreign liberation
struggles.40 In his 2007 essay on artists’ collectives in New York, art historian Alan W. Moore
observes that the forces driving these political revolutions were inseparable from growing
cultural revolutions, arguing that “it is neither easy nor especially useful to separate collectivity
in the visual arts from the welter of group activities in multiple media that made up the warresisting counterculture of the 1960s.”41 Cultural history professor Bradford D. Martin recalls
that the Art Workers’ Coalition (AWC) and Guerrilla Art Action Group (GAAC) began to
participate in politicized art and protest when “the political and social crises of the late sixties
intersected with a decade of art world trends that deployed everyday life as subject matter.”42 In
contrast with the individualism and apolitical nature of earlier movements such as Abstract
Expressionism,43 a wide variety of artists’ collectives formed by the early 1970s to explore
solutions to the societal issues that affected artists, including concerns over equitable treatment
and pay regardless of race, gender, class, and other demographics. In addition to their broader
social and political activist goals, these groups were also interested in gaining greater control
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over their own work through various attempted reforms of copyright and moral rights
legislation.44
As the art world entered the 1970s, it witnessed an artist-driven increase in the pursuit of
legislation that would provide assistance and equality, both moral and economic, for art
workers.45 Those concerned about the institutional mistreatment of art workers also chased legal
reform regarding issues such as resale royalties, minority representation, and copyright revisions.
Within artist-led organizations such as the AWC, GAAC, National Art Workers’ Community
(NAWC), and innumerable others, members devised lists of goals and demands in a union-like
motion to achieve broad economic and political reforms within the elitist structures of the art
world. The NAWC, for example, outlined the goals of its foundation in a list of ten “NAWC
Proposals,” published in a 1971 volume of their Art Workers Newsletter. These proposals
included a complaint bureau for unethical behavior in the art world, various studies “into the
actual economics of the American artist,” a study to see whether the gallery and museum system
“operates in the best interest of working artists,” and a study of American businesses and their
relationship to artists. Jacqueline Skiles, an artist and member of several collective organizations
including the AWC and NAWC, wrote in 1975 that the business study was intended to “pave the
way for copyright reform, possibly setting up a new copyright category called Artist Domain.”46
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An increased hostility to the institutional structures of the art world characterized these
groups. In reference to the AWC, Skiles wrote, “The artists involved challenged the methods by
which artists were chosen for inclusion or exclusion from galleries, museum shows and
purchases, commissions, grants, reviews, and other special favors—favors which abounded in
wealth and fame for a select few, while the rest had to scratch to make ends meet.”47 In fact, the
AWC itself formed from attendees of a January 1969 demonstration at the Museum of Modern
Art (MoMA). According to Martin, the museum had included Tele-sculpture, a 1960 kinetic
sculpture by Greek artist Takis, in their exhibition The Machine as Seen at the End of the
Mechanical Age in spite of the artist’s “written explanation that the piece was outdated and no
longer represented his work.”48 During the demonstration, Takis carried his artwork out of the
exhibition and into the sculpture garden and remained there with the protesters until Bates
Lowry, then-director of the MoMA, would meet with them. After bringing the protestors into his
office, he agreed to remove the sculpture from the show and place it in storage.49
MoMA became a frequent site for AWC protests. In March 1969, for instance, the AWC
gathered at the museum to demand increased representation of Black and Latino artists in
dedicated wings, satellite branches in these artists’ communities, and a solution to admissions
fees which exclude minority communities.50 The heavy anti-establishment sentiments of these
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cooperative organizations found a later parallel in Wojnarowicz’s relentless criticisms of the
government and his commitment to protecting institutionally neglected communities. Though the
AFA’s attacks on the NEA also challenged the government, this misrepresentation of
Wojnarowicz’s images eliminated the artworks’ original message, instead using them to promote
homophobia and the abolition of federal arts funding.
Aside from the activities of formal groups, individuals also participated in the new
climate of collective aid and the expansion of artists’ rights. One of the strongest individual
proponents of artists’ rights causes in the mid-to-late twentieth century was Robert
Rauschenberg. The artist, well aware that he reaped the benefits of the elitist systems sustaining
the art world, leveraged the recognition his work had received to pursue and provide aid for
artists who did not have the same standing or influence. Rauschenberg was unafraid to share his
criticisms of the government’s relationship to creators and their work, particularly during his
controversial pursuit of resale royalties throughout the 1970s.51 During a 1976 newspaper
interview with the Washington Evening Star, Rauschenberg remarked, “The copyright laws are
extremely weak, particularly in the visual arts, and yet American artists are the greatest artists in
the world.”52 In a 2013 oral history interview, Rauschenberg’s friend and longtime collaborator
Donald Saff recalled visiting the Capitol with the artist to argue for moral rights, copyright, and
royalty legislation, including the suggestion that resale royalties could be donated to the NEA.53
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Throughout his career, the artist was an active supporter of the NEA. During a March 1981
statement to Congress, Rauschenberg argued against funding cuts as he declared, “The strength
of all our artistic establishments rest [sic] on the development of outstanding individuals. … The
survival of this rare professional breed exists already with the most minimal structured support,
without normal tax benefits, social security, pension plans, group insurance or hospitalization
and usually living in illegal work spaces. Now to cut and withdraw the only national aid this
country provided is cultural insanity.”54 Rauschenberg and his contemporaries wielded
significant political strength, and he deliberately used this level of influence to aid other artists. 55
Many of the artists’ collectives discussed above were short-lived; their ranks largely
dwindled or dissolved after only a few years, as many members joined other social movements
and those who remained faced a lack of adequate funding to provide fair pay for the artists who
led each group.56 One of the stronger continuing effects of collective activism on present-day
artists’ rights concerns is an ongoing desire for extended control over the ownership, use, and
display of artworks. In Is it Ours?, Martha Buskirk discusses the largely unrealized goal of
“conditional ownership,” referencing Takis’s aforementioned removal of Tele-sculpture from the
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MoMA in January 1969. Only a few months later, the AWC hosted an open hearing in April
1969, during which Sol LeWitt read a list of six demands:
1. A work of art by a living artist would still be the property of the artist. A collector
would, in a sense, be the custodian of that art.
2. The artist would be consulted when his work is displayed, reproduced, or used in any
way.
3. The museum, collector, or publication would compensate the artist for use of his art.
This is a rental, beyond the original purchase price. The rental could be nominal; the
principle of a royalty would be used.
4. An artist would have the right to retrieve his work from a collection if he compensates
the purchaser with the original price or a mutually agreeable substitute.
5. When a work is resold from one collector to another, the artist would be compensated
with a percentage of the price.
6. An artist should have the right to change or destroy any work of his as long as he
lives.57
Though LeWitt’s demands were rather extreme, this type of control has slowly entered United
States art law in the form of “moral rights,” based on the French term “droit moral,” a type of
legal protection that allows artists to regulate non-economic aspects of their work, particularly
those tied to the artist’s personality or reputation such as attribution, alteration, display, or
misrepresentation.58 The concepts driving copyright and moral rights are quite similar in
practice; Buskirk remarks that “even though moral rights are traditionally understood as distinct
from the economic interests protected by copyright, the two are deeply intertwined in the US
copyright code’s definition of a work of visual art.”59 Moral rights can offer an artist some
degree of control over an image when copyright does not, and vice versa. Both are a form of
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artists’ rights, albeit much less extreme than the rights which groups like the AWC had
demanded.
Moral rights depend upon the idea that an artwork is an expression of an artist’s
individual personality. Attorney Sarah Leggin explains that this personal connection leads
authors to seek the right to “control the eventual fate of these works,” even after ownership of
those works has been transferred.60 Nadia Walravens, researcher at the University of Paris,
explains that artists typically perceive each image as an expression of their individual
personality, so the infringement of both copyright and moral rights alike would, in theory, break
“the bond between the author and the work” through a theft of the original author’s personal
expression.61
The actions which might actually break this bond, however, are limited. Gay Morris’s
1981 article “When Artists Use Photographs: Is it Fair Use, Legitimate Transformation or RipOff?” predominantly contains interviews with photographers whose images have been used by
more famous artists. One of these photographers is Patricia Caulfield, who described herself as
“not the kind of person to go out and sue people.” However, Andy Warhol’s use of her
photograph in his 1964 Flowers paintings upset her enough to pursue legal action; she later
clarified, “The reason there’s a legal issue here is because there’s a moral one … what’s irritating
is to have someone like an image enough to use it, but then denigrate the original talent.”62
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Caulfield’s moral complaint is not especially specific; apart from the fact that Warhol did not
secure her permission or provide payment for an extended series of prints, Caulfield does not
provide a reason why Warhol’s Flowers denigrates her own talent.63
The combination of copyright and moral rights in the visual arts finds more success when
a case involves an image that has been copied for a malicious purpose, such as Wildmon’s use of
Wojnarowicz’s artwork in his homophobic anti-NEA pamphlet.64 Wojnarowicz directly
exercised his moral rights under NYAARA, a 1984 New York state law created in response to
similar legislation passed in California. NYAARA provides limited protections to certain types
of artworks:
[N]o person other than the artist or a person acting with the artist’s consent shall
knowingly display … to the public or publish a work of fine art or limited edition
multiple of not more than three hundred copies by that artist or a reproduction thereof in
an altered, defaced, mutilated or modified form if the work is displayed, published or
reproduced as being the work of the artist, or under circumstances under which it would
reasonably be regarded as being the work of the artist, and damage to the artist's
reputation is reasonably likely to result therefrom.65
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In its analysis of the AFA’s violation of NYAARA, the district court found that Wildmon’s
pamphlet, being “the public display of an altered artwork, falsely attributed to the original artist,”
did not deserve protection because “such deception serves no socially useful purpose.”66 This
denial of utility echoes the pamphlet’s suggestion that Wojnarowicz’s work does not have social
or artistic merit. Though Wojnarowicz’s NYAARA claim was successful, the nominal damages
of $1 did not erase the harmful social conditions that enabled the creation of the AFA pamphlet,
which vilified Wojnarowicz, Tongues of Flame, the NEA, and homosexuality all at once.67
Leggin argues that “the Wojnarowicz court squarely confronted the shortcomings of …
[NYAARA] and the fair use doctrine in addressing [Wojnarowicz’s] moral rights claims.”68
These shortcomings confirm that, if this case was perhaps not wholly a victory for the artist, it at
least stands as evidence of the ongoing challenges of artists’ rights activism.
In December 1990, several months after the conclusion of Wojnarowicz, Congress passed
the Visual Artists’ Rights Act (VARA) into law as an amendment of the Copyright Act, marking
the first acknowledgement of moral rights on a federal level.69 VARA grants artworks a set of
protections similar to those of NYAARA, using the following language:
[T]he author of a work of visual art—
(1) Shall have the right—
(A) to claim authorship of that work, and
(B) to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any work of
visual art which he or she did not create;
66
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(2) Shall have the right to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of the
work of visual art in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other modification of
the work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation70
VARA faced a lukewarm reception due to its fairly narrow scope. The Artists Rights Society
describes VARA as a “flawed moral rights measure,” while Leggin observes that it “has been
widely criticized by artists’ rights groups because it applies only to visual arts, does not apply to
works for hire, and thus only allows authors to make claims in limited circumstances.”71 One of
the most significant issues that groups like the Artists’ Rights Society finds with VARA in its
current state is the fact that it primarily applies to work created on or after June 1, 1991; earlier
works are only protected under VARA if the artist had not yet sold them or otherwise transferred
their title to the work before that date.72
Additionally, Wojnarowicz’s NYAARA “victory” is a legal anomaly in the sense that
courts have been slow to fully implement moral rights laws like NYAARA and VARA to any
significant extent in visual arts cases. Leggin writes that “American courts have demonstrated
that they are much more comfortable relying on contract or economic principles to justify moral
rights-esque claims, since payment or performance as recognition of value are easier to explain
and justify than is the value of non-property, intellectual attributes which bond the artist to his
work.”73 Even in Wojnarowicz, a case which formally recognizes moral rights to a degree that
most other visual arts decisions do not, it is difficult to consider Wojnarowicz the “winner”
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because the court decision places equal emphasis on the fair use inquiry and the interpretation of
NYAARA. Leggin states that “the influence of the controversial Wojnarowicz case on the
forward progress of moral rights recognition is still unclear as the court weighed the fair use
argument against the assertion of moral rights, and found that despite constituting a violation of
the artist’s moral rights, federal copyright law allowed the AFA’s transformative use under the
fair use doctrine.”74 This resistance to the adoption of moral rights protections, and the more
easily quantifiable nature of copyright and fair use, leads artists to pursue copyright infringement
lawsuits as a vehicle for moral concerns.
In ”Why Art Does Not Need Copyright,” Amy Adler describes copyright in the art world
as a “stealth system” of moral rights. In doing so, she argues that copyright no longer retains its
original market-focused utilitarian purpose and has therefore been rendered unnecessary. She
asks, “Why do artists invoke copyright if it does not incentivize them economically (as the
utilitarian argument [for copyright] had assumed it would)? I believe that artists actually use
copyright for a surprising reason: to police and protect their reputations and their artistic
vision.”75 Adler implies that this “off-label use of copyright”76 is best suited to artists who do not
sue for financial reasons, such as a loss of income from an unauthorized use of their artwork, and
that most of these artists pursue copyright cases with a moral rights motive that runs contrary to
the public interests of copyright law.77 Wojnarowicz is an exception. As an artist with an
unmistakable mission to educate the public, his lawsuit against Wildmon was an act of
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advocacy—for arts funding, for PWAs, for gay men, for a more equitable society—that required
him to leverage his own legal rights. Reflecting upon the AFA dispute in 1994 as Wojnarowicz’s
former attorney, Cole wrote that “David’s suit, of course, was not ultimately about money; it was
about calling Wildmon to task for using distortions and lies in his effort to stop the NEA from
supporting artists, like David, who communicated perspectives the fundamentalist right would
rather did not exist.”78 While Wojnarowicz’s inclusion of NYAARA meant that he did not
employ the “stealth system” of moral rights in his lawsuit, the dispute was still driven by the
desire to regain control over the dissemination of his images to the public.
Leggin argues that the Wojnarowicz decision demonstrates that moral rights laws alone
are “insufficient to remedy the harms artists have suffered.”79 Consider, for instance, the dollar
Wojnarowicz won after Wildmon had disparaged his artworks in a document sent to tens of
thousands of politicians and other figures. Though the AFA distributed the corrective document,
the pamphlet had already been distributed; its damage was done.80 The symbolic payment
marked a satisfying conclusion to the short-term legal issue of the pamphlet, but it had little to no
impact on the broader social and artistic debates that drove both Wojnarowicz’s and Wildmon’s
fury-filled careers. Leggin’s article suggests that an integration of moral rights with the fair use
doctrine would strengthen both types of laws in support of artists and their work.
Leggin suggests that in place of standalone moral rights laws, an expansion of the fourth
factor of fair use would allow courts to “bridge the divide between utilitarian and economic
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considerations, and moral or identity-related factors that underlie artists’ claims.”81 She holds a
particular interest in the shortcomings of copyright’s moral neutrality. While Wildmon’s
pamphlet was a fair use under the current doctrine—in part because his criticisms of the NEA
implicate First Amendment concerns—his intentions were malicious and his claims inaccurate.
A doctrine of fair use that considers these elements might therefore better benefit the public;
Leggin writes, “Courts tend to favor a finding of fair use when the use provides the public with
access to important information. However, there is ‘no public interest in false facts.’ A use that
distorts a work or misleads viewers should not be awarded fair use protection since, in these
cases, copyright law’s goal of ‘promoting the Progress of Science and useful Arts’ would be
better served by preventing the use than by allowing it.”82 In reality, copyright’s adoption of
moral rights seems unlikely in the short term because the boundary between morally detrimental
uses and harmless image recycling remains quite hazy. This thesis is not the venue in which this
question will be resolved.
Over the course of his life—he was thirty-five years old at the time of the lawsuit—
Wojnarowicz had developed a difficult relationship with the law. From childhood experiences
with poverty and prostitution to the AIDS epidemic that would eventually kill him, Wojnarowicz
could rarely depend on the law to support his best interests.83 By the time of his dispute with the
AFA, he was already familiar with the threat of censorship which, as noted in art historian
Richard Meyer’s book Outlaw Representation, was particularly strong for the work of gay
artists. Meyer’s fifth chapter, “Vanishing Points: Art, Aids, and the Problem of Visibility,”
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explains that the public’s association of AIDS with gay men correlates with the suppression and
censure of work by artists like Wojnarowicz who “insisted on homosexual visibility” and
launched counterattacks against threats to the display of their work.84
Tongues of Flame was not Wojnarowicz’s first NEA controversy. In late 1989,
photographer Nan Goldin curated an exhibition in New York with the help of a $10,000 NEA
grant; titled Witnesses Against Our Vanishing, this exhibition focused on various themes
surrounding the AIDS crisis. Wojnarowicz contributed an essay to the catalogue which so
viciously criticized several political and religious officials—recall his fiery indictment of
“repulsive senator” Jesse Helms—that the NEA attempted to rescind its grant. John Frohnmayer,
then-chairman of the NEA, took issue with the “political nature” of the exhibition overall and
found Wojnarowicz’s essay to be the most prominent example.85 Some passages of the artist’s
text, within his larger criticism of politicians’ approach to AIDS, were intentionally provocative:
I’m beginning to believe that one of the last frontiers left for radical gesture is the
imagination. At least in my ungoverned imagination I can fuck somebody without a
rubber, or I can, in the privacy of my own skull, douse Helms with a bucket of gasoline
and set his putrid ass on fire or throw rep. William Dannemeyer off the empire state
building [sic]. These fantasties give me distance from my outrage for a few seconds.
They give me momentary comfort.86
Artists Space, the venue for Witnesses Against Our Vanishing, refused to return the grant
and eventually reached a compromise with the NEA: the exhibition could retain its funding, but
no part of the grant could fund the catalogue.87 Because the NEA had rejected the themes of
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Wojnarowicz’s written work in 1989, nothing would have stopped them from similarly revoking
their support for his visual work in Tongues of Flame, especially with Wildmon’s
encouragement. Wojnarowicz, already acutely aware that he could not rely on any lawmaker to
defend him, would have remembered this act of censorship when he sued Wildmon; because
there was no guarantee that the NEA would protect his work, he had to protect it himself.
The 1990 case revealed, however, that the copyright laws were similarly unreliable.
Reflecting on the case, Cole wondered, “What could a lawyer do for a man who lived his life in
spite of and in defiance of the law? One thing a lawyer often does is speak for his of [sic] her
clients, giving voice to complaints and concerns that might otherwise go unarticulated. But
David hardly needed representation in that sense; representation was what he did best.”88 Cole’s
role was to guide Wojnarowicz through the process. Though the dispute with the AFA was a
critical assertion of the artist’s rights, Wojnarowicz experienced personal and creative difficulties
throughout the process. In the two years between the trial and his death in 1992, the artist
occasionally spoke of the case as both a political necessity and a new exploration of self:
The only way I can claim a territory for myself is to surround myself with it and get to
understand its shape. Once I know its shape then it can’t affect me. So with the American
Family Association and Reverend Wildmon, I understand the range of their power. …
But to push through the illusion of law that says I’m unlawful, because of my desire and
embrace the form my desire takes is my right as a body moving through space, to make
rules for myself. Not even rules, but to define movement for myself. It’s basically just
walking through their illusion, their projection of order, and creating my own order in it
out of all the fragmentary stuff that surrounds us, that we call life.89
Though he claimed that the lawsuit could not affect him, the spring and summer of 1990 was
deeply distressing for the artist’s health and artmaking. According to Inde, Wojnarowicz’s initial
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discovery of the AFA pamphlet led to various physical and emotional symptoms, including a
period of serious depression, that affected his ability to create new work.90 In a National Public
Radio interview with Terry Gross on Fresh Air, the artist describes the effects of the exhausting
and time-consuming process on his life. When Gross asked Wojnarowicz whether he welcomed
the opportunity to take a political stance through the lawsuit, he responded, “No, I don’t
welcome that. And I find that being involved in a lawsuit that what it’s doing is preventing me
from continuing working … I find it very, very disruptive.”91 Based on his combined reluctance
and fury throughout and after the process, Wojnarowicz pursued this case not because he wanted
to, but because he felt the need to.
In many ways, Wojnarowicz’s lawsuit aligned with the evolving role of collective
activism in the visual arts. From Cole’s perspective, “In a sense, the law was another medium
through which to communicate: he’d done performance art, graffiti, photography, painting,
sculpture, essays, and music. Now he’d use the law.”92 Each of the coalitions in the second half
of the twentieth century, from AWC to ACT UP, shared a general artistic and social vision of a
better society. Their pursuit of a more equitable climate in the art world left a strong legacy in
Wojnarowicz’s life and practice. During a conversation with Nan Goldin, he affirmed, “We all
affect each other, especially by being open enough to make each other feel less alienated in terms
of what the experience of living in this country is. We all have that possibility or embody that
possibility of having profound effects on each other.”93 Stemming from the demands of artists’
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rights collectives, federal arts funding controversies, and AIDS advocacy—issues that persist
today—Wojnarowicz knew that he could use a combination of laws, albeit with mixed success,
to aggressively protect his radical view of America and its controversies.
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Conclusion
Art and copyright law will always exist at odds, if only because artmaking strategies
develop faster than significant legal changes can be enacted.1 This tension results in fluctuating
interpretations of the law that feed a quickly growing field of scholarship. The challenges and
inconsistencies in our courts’ interpretation of copyright law, particularly the determination of
fair use, should not deter artists from creating or defending their work. Martha Buskirk, writing
on the “imperfect instrument” of law, notes that “artistic engagement with the rule of law has the
potential to demonstrate the limits of its efficacy.”2 Such engagement does not require an artist to
infringe upon another’s copyright or participate in a lawsuit, as the overwhelming majority of
legal disputes in the visual arts settle out of court.
The settlement rate is partially rooted in the power dynamic that burdens our copyright
system. Lawsuits are expensive and time-consuming; it is often the wealthiest or most powerful
artists who can afford to entertain extended legal procedures. Even out-of-court settlements are
reached much more quickly when an artist can offer a copy of the infringing artwork as part of
the agreement. According to multimedia artist Patricia Search, “Commercially successful artists
such as Rauschenberg and Warhol may be able to resolve appropriation disputes by
compensating other artists for the use of their work with gifts of artwork, royalties and promises
of future acknowledgement. However, artists who do not have an established market value for
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their work may not be able to settle their legal problems so easily.”3 In the 1977 settlement
between Morton Beebe and Robert Rauschenberg, for instance, Rauschenberg agreed to give
Beebe $3,000 and an edition of Pull, the print which had included Beebe’s photograph.4 In a
1985 letter to the advisors of the Rauschenberg Overseas Cultural Interchange (ROCI),
Rauschenberg revealed his rather casual attitude towards another lawsuit: “I am being sued for 3
million dollars. The suit is now waiting for arbitration. With the skill of Ted Kheel
[Rauschenberg’s attorney] I will probably survive without forfeiting too much. There will have
to be some kind of settlement for monies spent. It remains to see how much and what.”5 Though
he mentioned this lawsuit to his advisors out of concern for the short-term funding of his ROCI
project, he was aware that a potential settlement payment would not significantly affect him.
In an earlier instance of alternate dispute resolution, Andy Warhol gave Patricia Caulfield
two of his 1964 Flowers paintings as part of their settlement agreement in 1966, later also giving
her twelve of the 250 portfolios in his 1970 Flowers print series.6 In her 1981 interview with Gay
Morris, Caulfield expressed her dissatisfaction with the settlements, but admits that both time
and money had prevented her from pursuing the matter further as “getting upset interferes with
the rest of your work.”7 For those lawsuits that do reach the courts, particularly those that return
to trial on one party’s appeal, it is unsurprising that many of those in the visual arts feature more
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recognized figures like those highlighted in this thesis. Not only can these artists often afford the
legal expenses, but a loss in court may not have a significant effect on their careers.8
Of course, art does not have to be “legal” to be good, interesting, or important. Buskirk
notes that “artistic integrity is not necessarily synonymous with following the letter of the law.”9
Not every artist takes issue with a potentially infringing use of their work, either; some are
content to contribute to the creative commons, allowing some acts of copyright infringement to
continue. Recall, for instance, Richard Prince’s indifference to the knowledge that another artist
has already tried to sell a copy of Spiritual America IV, Prince’s 2005 photograph of Brooke
Shields; in his deposition, he stated, “It’s fine with me, yeah. I have no control over it. I mean it’s
their piece, not mine.”10 The Andy Warhol Foundation, in contrast, adopted a more proactive
attitude to Goldsmith’s lawsuit. By filing a counterclaim, the Warhol Foundation asked the court
to declare Warhol’s work not infringing and dismiss Goldsmith’s suit. David Wojnarowicz took
the most aggressive approach of the three subjects of this thesis, risking his money and time to
protect the integrity of his work and his broader activist goals from political harm through
copyright and moral rights laws. All three types of relationships with copyright law are equally
valid; how an artist chooses to handle a dispute is, in the end, a personal choice that may be
influenced by income, emotion, morality, activism, or personality.
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As copyright infringement disputes inevitably continue, we can look to the unique
scenarios guiding past court decisions to explore how we read artworks and resolve conflicts in
the art world. Most creators, however, will never know if their work has been copied unless the
infringing user is well-known, and only a fraction of those artists will pursue legal action. Those
who do, however, set long-lasting precedents for contemporary debates surrounding artmaking,
sale, and exhibition. Authorship is complicated, often messy, particularly when it comes into
question; the fate of an artwork after it leaves the artist’s hands remains entirely unpredictable.
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Illustrations

Figure 1. Richard Prince, Back to the Garden, 2008. Mixed media on inkjet-printed canvas, 80 x
120 inches. Image source: Gagosian Gallery.
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Figure 2. Richard Prince, Ding Dong the Witch is Dead, 2008. Mixed media on inkjet-printed
canvas, 58 x 84 inches. Image source: Gagosian Gallery.
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Figure 3. Richard Prince, Charlie Company, 2008. Mixed media on inkjet-printed canvas, 131 x
100 inches. Image source: Cariou v. Prince appendix,
https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/docs/opn1197/11-1197apx.html.
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Figure 4. Art Rogers, Puppies, 1985. Black-and-white photograph on notecard, 5 x 7 inches.
Image source: http://www.artrogers.com/portraits.html.
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Figure 5. Jeff Koons, String of Puppies, 1988, polychromed wood, 42 x 62 x 37 inches. Image
source: http://www.jeffkoons.com/artwork/banality/string-puppies.
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Figure 6. Lynn Goldsmith, photograph of Prince for Newsweek, December 1981. Image source:
Andy Warhol Foundation v. Goldsmith.
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Figure 7. Andy Warhol, untitled image from the Prince Series, illustration for “Purple Fame,”
article by Tristan Vox for Vanity Fair, 1984. Acrylic and silkscreen ink on linen, 20 x 16 inches,
reproduced on magazine page. Image source: Andy Warhol Foundation v. Goldsmith.
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Figure 8. Exhibits from Andy Warhol Foundation v. Goldsmith, 2021: Andy Warhol, Prince
Series, 1984. Acrylic and silkscreen ink on linen, each 20 x 16 inches. Image source: Andy
Warhol Foundation v. Goldsmith.
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Figure 9. American Family Association, “Your Tax Dollars Helped Pay for these ‘Works of
Art,’” April 1990. Partial reproduction of two-page pamphlet in Elizabeth Hess, “Artist Doesn’t
Turn Other Cheek,” The Village Voice, May 22, 1990,
https://galleries.illinoisstate.edu/exhibitions/1990/wojnarowicz/Press4.pdf.
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The text of the pamphlet reads as follows:
The photographs appearing on this sheet were part of the David Wojnarowicz “Tongues
of Flame” exhibit catalog. The University Galleries at Illinois State University recently
exhibited “Tongues of Flame.” The National Endowment for the Arts, a federal agency
funded by tax dollars, awarded the University Galleries $15,000 to help pay for the
exhibit.
The exhibit came after Congress passed a law last year prohibiting the NEA from funding
“depictions of sadomasochism, homo-eroticism, the sexual exploitation of children, or
individuals engaged in sex acts,” and after John Frohnmayer became chairman of the
NEA.
At a hearing on the NEA earlier this year, Congressman Pat Williams, D-MT, asked Mr.
Frohnmayer if the NEA should permit grants for the creation of such material. Mr.
Frohnmayer responded, “I would say yes.” Congressman Williams praised the chairman
for his attitude: “It shows real determination that the NEA not be used as a censorship
agency.”
NEA spokesman Josh Dare said: “We have no power to suggest anything to them (artists)
or to exercise any control over what they do with the money we’ve given them.” Dare
denied that the NEA funded the Wojnarowicz “Tongues of Flame” exhibit, explaining,
“Illinois State applied for a grant to support a retrospective of this particular artist’s work.
We approved the money for them. They are the ones providing money for Wojnarowicz.”
For years efforts have been made to stop the NEA from funding such “works of art.” But
because the NEA has friends in key positions in Congress, Congress has been unwilling
to cut off NEA funding. The NEA says that if Congress refuses to provide tax dollars to
support artists who produce such material as appears on this sheet, that would be
censorship.
This is the year for reauthorization for the NEA. Last year the NEA received
$171,000,000. This year the request is for $175,000,000.
Before you vote, find out if your Congressman and Senators voted to reauthorize the
NEA for another 5 years and thus continue using tax dollars to fund such “works of art”
as those on this sheet. If they do vote for reauthorization, remember that when you vote in
the upcoming Congressional and Senatorial races. This sheet has been presented to all
members of the House and Senate for their information.
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Figure 10. David Wojnarowicz, Untitled, from the Sex Series, 1989. Gelatin silver print, 14 3/4 x
17 11/16 inches. Museum of Modern Art, New York.
https://www.moma.org/collection/works/51346.
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Figure 11. David Wojnarowicz, Untitled (Genet After Brassaï), 1979. Xeroxed collage on paper,
26 x 36 5/16 inches. Zimmerli Art Museum, Rutgers University.
https://zimmerli.emuseum.com/objects/55625/untitled-genet-after-brassai.
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Figure 12. American Family Association, uncashed check for one dollar in legal damages, made
out to David Wojnarowicz and signed by Donald Wildmon. Dated October 16, 1989. David
Wojnarowicz Papers, Fales Library, New York University. Reproduced in Ault, “Notes Toward
a Frame of Reference,” in History Keeps Me Awake at Night, 103.
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Figure 13. David Wojnarowicz, Subspecies Helms Senatorius, 1990. Silver dye bleach print, 16 x
20 inches. Whitney Museum of American Art, New York.
https://whitney.org/collection/works/33273.
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Figure 6. ACT UP volunteer holding recent news articles next to David Wojnarowicz’s 1990
print Untitled (One Day This Kid…) during the 2018 Whitney Museum retrospective History
Keeps Me Awake at Night. Image courtesy of ACT UP New York and Michelle Wild.
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